Cognitive Semantics for Creole Linguistics:
Applications of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Cognitive Grammar
to Afro-Caribbean Creole Language and Cultural Studies

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of:

Doctor of Philosophy

November 2016
Department of English
College of Humanities
University of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras

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Abstract

The goal of the current project is to bring new methodologies developed in cognitive linguistics in recent years to bear on some key debates among creolists concerning universals, African agency, and the role of African and Indigenous persons’ resistance in the emergence of the Atlantic creoles. In Chapter 1, I introduce cognitive semantics against a backdrop of current trends in creolistics. I review the literature and show how findings in cognitive semantics can be extended to the study of creoles. While the thesis represents new research in creolistics, I maintain the commitment that creolists have made to empirical approaches to the study of creole language structures. To this point, I have used a large body of language data that is suitable for conducting key word in context (KWIC) concordance searches using a computer software program. In Chapter 2, I draw on a specialized corpus of Afro-Caribbean English-lexifier creole (AEC) as spoken in St. Croix to carry out a cognitive-functional analysis of the verb-preposition interface in creole languages. In Chapter 3, I provide an analysis of the lexicalization of abstract concepts in AECs. I show that expressions of greed and envy, for example, are realized via metaphorical and metonymic processes, which points to convergence between substrate and superstrate input, as well as our human semantic potential for conceptual construal. In Chapter 4, I review conceptual metaphors that were circulated during a time period that coincided with the transition to a new capitalist model of colonial domination by Europe, first over the Americas and eventually over Africa. In Chapter 5, I present new ideas that help us to deconstruct dominant discourses that prevail about complexity and grammar in AECs. In Chapter 6, I summarize the findings and suggest future avenues of research on cognitive semantics in creole linguistics.
Biographical Information

Dr. Micah Corum is Assistant Professor of English and linguistics at Inter American University of Puerto Rico, San Germán. He received a Ph.D. in Linguistics from Hamburg University. His work has been published in edited volumes, peer-reviewed journals, and TESOL newsletters. In his monograph published by Mouton de Gruyter, he provided a large scale, in-depth analysis of locative constructions in West African pidgin and creole languages.
Introduction

Cognitive Semantics for Creole Linguistics

Applications of cognitive linguistics to areas of semantic inquiry have been largely neglected in contemporary studies of creole languages and cultures. The present study is part of a larger project that promotes a cognitive-functional approach to the linguistic and cultural study of creole languages. This component of the project is meant to demonstrate the usefulness of cognitive semantics for creole linguistics research. For instance, the research in Chapter 4 of this thesis identifies some of the metaphorical conceptualizations that, on the one hand, have been responsible for predatory processes of colonization and globalization in the Caribbean and beyond and, on the other hand, have motivated successful acts of resistance against the European metropoles by Indigenous-, African-, and non-propertied European-descended persons of the Afro-Atlantic.

Cognitive semantics for creole linguistics highlights outcomes of language contact phenomena in terms of the creative, multilayered capacities of the human mind, for example, to transmit cultural conceptualizations and to express them as linguistic manifestations of hybrid language contact processes. Cognitive semantics is concerned primarily with “multiformity of the meaning of human experience conceptualized in language” (Albertazzi, 2000, p. 15). Cognitive semantics for creole linguistics goes beyond the idea that meaning emerges from algorithmic processes performed in the mind. Such an approach suggests that meanings in both physical and linguistic acts are motivated by the “dynamics of the construal activity performed by the mind, or in other words, the ability of the mind to conceive and represent the same
situation from different perspectives, or different directions of thought” (Albertazzi, 2000, p. 13; see more recently Bergen, 2012). Cognitive semantics for creole linguistics makes a case for speaker agency in the creation of creole languages and furthers discussions on ways in which African- and Indigenous-descended persons managed to create linguistic systems in the face of colonization and globalization. It is based on second-wave cognitive linguistics, the most recently developed framework used to study the roles that semantics and pragmatics play in the grammars of the world’s languages. In their hypothesis on the origin of language(s), Fauconnier and Turner state:

Language, in the strong sense, must be equipotential. It must be serviceable too for the innumerable new situations we encounter. But the only way it can be equipotential is for the human mind to be able to blend those new situations with what we already know to give us intelligible blends with attached grammatical patterns so those existing grammatical patterns can express the new situations. To say something new, we do not need to invent new grammar…. Rather, we need to conceive of a blend that lets existing grammar come into play. Only in this way can an individual with small, relatively fixed vocabulary of words and basic grammatical patterns cope with an extremely rich and open-ended world.

(2002, p. 182, emphasis added)

Fauconnier and Turner provide numerous cases in their book on the mind’s hidden complexities to point to language users’ remarkable propensity for creativity and resourcefulness. The study of metaphor is one area of the creative mind that has received much attention in second-wave cognitive linguistics and, more specifically, cognitive semantics research. The current project draws on findings from the study of
metaphor and metonymy like those presented in the above quote, as well as those put forward by leading linguists in the field of cognitive semantics, such as Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999), Lakoff and Turner (1989), Lakoff (1993), Goldberg (1995, 2006), Kövecses (2005), Wolf and Polzenhagen (2009), and Bergen (2012). Talmy (2011) reports that the conceptual approach to cognitive linguistics has remained true to explorations of “basic ideational and affective categories attributed to cognitive agents” (p. 623). The present work is a contribution to cognitive semantics applied to a creole context in which agency is highlighted on the part of marginalized peoples in the creation and maintenance of languages and cultures of the Afro-Atlantic maritime world.

This thesis departs from traditional approaches to the study of creolistics in that it takes a much-needed retreat from the trends that have dominated 20th-century Cartesian linguistics (see section 1.1 for an overview of this term). The present study draws on cognitive linguistics and sociolinguistics to situate Afro-Caribbean English-lexifier creoles (AECs) in relation to the ecological and cultural matrices that typify heteroglossic communities where extensive language negotiating and mixing occurs. It emphasizes human beings’ universal capacity to be inventive and to carry out communicative events cooperatively with the cognitive means that are at our disposal. I draw mainly from theories based in cognitive semantics. In the next chapter, I provide an overview of certain issues and sub-areas of cognitive semantics that set the background for discussions in later chapters.

Objectives of the Current Study

According to Heine and Leyew (2008), there are 11 linguistic properties that make Africa a typologically defined linguistic region (p. 28). African languages have between 5 and 10 of those properties, whereas other languages in the world contain at
most 5. The list below contains 7 of the 11 properties that Heine and Leyew regard as pertinent to this African typology (2008, p. 29); I omit the first four since they deal with phonology and not with morphosyntax or semantics:

1) Verbal derivational suffixes (passives, causative, benefactive, etc.)

2) Nominal modifiers

3) Semantic polysemy ‘drink (A)/pull (B), smoke’

4) Semantic polysemy ‘hear (A)/see (B), understand’

5) Semantic polysemy ‘animal, meat’

6) Comparative constructions based on schema [X is big defeats/surpasses/passes Y]

7) Noun ‘child’ is used productively to express diminutive meaning

The authors use the properties listed above as a checklist for assessing typological relatedness and conclude, “creole languages do not exhibit any noticeable typological affinity with African languages” (2008, p. 35). The six pidgin and creole languages that Heine and Leyew analyzed contained on average 2.3 of the 11 features.

Although the creoles of the Atlantic are not typologically related to African languages–according to Heine and Leyew’s criteria–they do exhibit more of the properties listed above than their European lexifiers (2008, p. 30). In a graded typology, then, creoles are more African in character than their European lexifiers. In this thesis, I discuss Africanisms like those listed by Heine and Leyew as they relate to the general semantic and morphosyntactic character common to AECs. I adopt a cognitive-functional approach to the analysis of grammar and lexicon, which argues for form-meaning pairings in language. From this perspective, morphosyntax and semantics cannot be divorced from each other; meaning motivates form and vice versa.
Creolists have shed considerable light on West African substrate sources that impacted the phonological and grammatical systems of AECs spoken in Afro-Atlantic communities. We can extend the substrate research endeavor by acknowledging West African and Indigenous Caribbean cultural conceptualizations that make up part of AECs grammars and lexicons. Chapter 3 of this thesis draws attention to those conceptualizations by turning our attention to the study of unconscious processes like metaphorical and metonymic reasoning that occur in “backstage cognition” (Fauconnier, 1994, pp. xvii-xlvi; Turner, 2000). Fauconnier and Turner (2002) claim that metaphorical reasoning “permits us to use vocabulary and grammar for one frame or domain or conceptual assembly to say things about others. It brings a level of efficiency and generality that suddenly makes the challenging mental logistics of expression tractable” (p. 182). Substrate research in creolistics has provided findings that add support to the processes that Fauconnier and Turner describe in the quote above.

Cognitive semantics for creole linguistics does not accept the claim that Western thought was overwhelmingly imposed on persons in language contact scenarios in the Afro-Atlantic to the extent that creole languages and cultures emerged as “approximations of approximations” of a European linguistic and cultural model (Chaudenson, 2001, p. 305; Mufwene, 2001). The current project looks to research that has adopted new ways to celebrate the creativity of creole consciousnesses and the hybrid nature of the arenas in which creoles emerged. For example, González López (2007, 2014) urges us to create a conceptual blend where written sources (considered as ‘factual’ by the dominant paradigm in science) and oral sources (considered as ‘fictional’ by the dominant paradigm) combine to create plausible scenarios that account for the emergence of creole languages:
Although the settings and the protagonists are based on historical facts, some of the details might be based on legend, or I filled them out with my imagination and my intuition. This is the first thing I want you to consider: the validity of legends as evidence for theories of Creole formation and genesis. You will have to develop the plot yourselves with your imagination and your creativity and your intuition, skills of the human spirit which rational scientific thinking rejects (González López, 2014, p. 35).

LeCompte Zambrana (2007) presents two arenas in the Caribbean that provide differing perspectives on the contact-situation vis-à-vis cohabitation in the Greater Antilles:

*Sociétés de plantation* are seen by historians as a ‘unifying force’ in the Caribbean because they imposed a single economic model on the region. But this model was based on a divisive and racialized system which marginalized all but the economy, culture, and language of the masters. *Sociétés de cohabitation* [coined by González López, 2007] can be seen as providing the basis for Caribbean unity ‘from below’ because they provided a multicultural matrix within which all of the diverse populations on the various islands could find a space for their different subsistence economies and for preservation and enrichment of their multiple cultural and linguistic repertoires.

Fauconnier and Turner’s blending theory (2002) uses the term *double scope conceptual integration* to refer to multiple blendings of facts and hypothetical situations that take place when humans make sense of discursive events. González López and LeCompte Zambrana’s studies are in line with the kind of approach to the study of culture, language, and cognition advocated by Fauconnier and Turner and their students in the cognitive linguistics enterprise.
The very existence of AECs reflects the creative responses on the part of all persons in the Caribbean who faced complex trade and co-habitation scenarios as they attempted to bridge their diverse linguistic backgrounds. In Chapter 1 of the present study, the point that I aim to make with the analogy of creole languages to emergent structure and the resulting conceptual blends is the following: linguistic and cultural artifacts give us insight into aspects of metaphorical and metonymic reasoning that occur in backstage cognition. Because language and culture are products of backstage cognition, it is no wonder that traces of the languages and cultures of the peoples who participated in contact language formation show up in linguistic and cultural practices of the Caribbean and the Pacific (for an extensive list of lexical and grammatical items that were diffused between Afro-Atlantic and Pacific creole-speaking networks, see Faraclas, Corum, Arrindell, & Pierre, 2007).

In Chapter 2, I take a preliminary look at semantic and syntactic characteristics that are common to AECs, namely the use of functional items that take on verbal attributes and mirror V2 functions in serialized verb constructions. I adopt a cognitive approach to grammar, which argues for form-function pairings in language (Goldberg, 1995, 2006; Langacker, 2008). To make genuine claims about the structure and use of the constructions referenced in Chapter 2, I have used a specialized corpus of English-lexifier creole that is composed of conversations between residents of an Afro-Caribbean creole-speaking community in St. Croix during in the early 2000s. A linguistics student from the Department of English at University of Puerto Rico retrieved the data during a linguistics fieldwork course in St. Croix (for details, see Vergne, 2008).

In Chapter 3, I focus on word forms and their collocational uses in phrases in AECs to draw attention to the domain of conceptual construal, for example,
lexicalizations of notions like *greed* and *lust*. I stress that universals and contact-induced changes were both involved in creolization processes from which these constructions were formed. The data for Chapter 3 were extracted from works that highlight African contributions to the creole lexicon (Alleyne, 1980, Chapter 4; Farquharson, 2012; Bartens & Baker, 2012).

In Chapter 4, I argue that historically marginalized populations, such as sailors, women, and pirates, played a significant role as agents in the development and maintenance of creole languages and communities in the Caribbean, despite the dominant position the English, French, Spanish, and Dutch held politically and linguistically during the era of colonization throughout the Antilles and the American continents. I apply the framework of conceptual metaphor theory as advanced by Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) to analyze motivations for the expansion era in the Atlantic maritime world (1500-1750), when European metropoles set out to explore and ultimately to conquer the so-called New World. I propose that the metaphor LAND AND PEOPLES AS COMMODIFIABLE RESOURCES was a necessary conceptual connection that needed to be circulated in media forms—short stories, cartoons, or critical essays—in order to become entrenched as part of the dominant discourses about Caribbean peoples and their lands during that era. This would lead to the rationalization of actions that have been carried out in the guise of civilization and enlightenment (Roberts, 2008), and that are continued today in terms of progress and modernization (Sachs, 1992).

In Chapter 5, I aim to add insights on the issue of complexity and simplicity in creole languages. Although creoles are rightly viewed as natural languages, they are still described as having the simplest grammars because they contain fewer linguistic units, phonetic distinctions, and derivational operations than their input languages
I begin the chapter by discussing dominant discourses that prevail in the study of AECs. The arguments and insights from Siegel (2008) guide the review of the literature and the discussion about an emerging consensus among creolists over metrics that can satisfactorily measure complexity. Complexity and simplicity are often framed in creole studies as objective notions that can be measured by counting linguistic units. My contribution to the discussion takes issue with the strict either/or division that is often made in the study of creole languages, namely that creoles either conform to patterns of the lexifier or confirm to patterns of the substrates and adstrates. It is also alarming that discourse strategies are rarely counted as metrics for determining complexity in creole grammar. Morphosyntax remains the major focus for determining inheritances from input languages, even in situations where creoles continue to be spoken alongside their input languages and have formed strong links with their substrates and adstrates, for example Guinea-Bissau Kriyol (Kihm, 2011):

The relative scarcity of morphosyntactic influences from the substrate does not mean, however, that Kriyol is not perfectly embedded in its sociolinguistic and cultural environment. Quite the opposite in fact: in terms of lexical semantics, discourse strategies, pragmatics, and language uses in general, Kriyol is just as ‘African’ as the surrounding languages – scare quotes necessary since the epithet is not susceptible of a precise definition, but it is an impressionistic label for a very complex set of cultural attitudes and practices, shared beliefs, etc. (p. 82)

Kihm’s impression about complex linguistic and cultural attitudes and practices have been confirmed by Farclas and The Working Group on the Agency of Marginalized Peoples in the Emergence of the Afro-Atlantic Creoles (2016). Their ideas about
ambiguity, dialogical interaction, and double voicing in creole grammar are explored and further supported in the final sections of Chapter 5.

In Chapter 6, I summarize the main ideas and most important findings of the thesis. I return to each chapter and discuss how a cognitive semantic approach can be used to better understand linguistic and cultural phenomena in creole studies.
Chapter 1

Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

1.1 Introduction

Until the middle of the 20th century, linguists in the United States who studied language and cognition assumed as an axiom the metaphor THE MIND IS A MACHINE\(^1\) (see Walmsley, 2012, pp. 5-29, for an overview of the conceptualization of the mind/brain problem starting with the mechanistic view of René Descartes and leading up to Alan Turing’s behavioral tests). In this view, it is believed that the mind switches to different states as words are produced. The mind is limited with respect to possibilities for subsequent states, so that in the end there are a finite number of utterances that can be produced and processed grammatically. This is called a “finite state Markov process” (Chomsky, 2002, p. 20). Chomsky’s linguistic revolution changed this conceptualization of language and the mind in 1957. Chomsky called for a more general concept of “linguistic level” (2002, p. 25). This linguistic level eventually became known as deep structure and it carried with it a number of philosophical assumptions about language and the mind. Chomsky’s Cartesian linguistics claims that it can account for differences that exist among languages on a surface level, while at the same time tell us something about a deep structure that reveals universal formal conditions in all languages (2009, p. 107). Chomsky argued for “a careful examination of classical linguistic theory, with its accompanying theory of mental processes” because he believed that it would assist linguists in their

\(^{1}\) Metaphors and references to conceptual domains appear in capital letters in this thesis.

Cartesian linguistics became the larger philosophical framing for Chomsky’s approach to syntax. The doctrine of Cartesian linguistics in the 1960s was that “[t]he general features of grammatical structure are common to all languages and reflect certain fundamental properties of the mind” (Chomsky, 2009, p. 98). Many aspects of this philosophy persist today in the study of linguistics, for example, the idea that there exist fundamental properties of the mind called “Common Notions” that are innate to the human language faculty (Chomsky, 2009, p. 99). Symbolic representations of these Common Notions are a necessary prerequisite for making sense of experiences that we have on a daily basis. That view is inherent in formal approaches to semantics, too. In formal semantics, Common Notions constitute the nature of external objects (Lewis, 2012, p. 173, cited in Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 201). They do not convey external objects themselves, rather they share the objective characteristics inherent to objects and to the ideas of the objects that we have in our minds: “[W]e possess hidden faculties which when stimulated by objects quickly respond to them” (2009, p. 99, quoting Herbert of Cherbury, 1937, pp. 105-106). It is through experience that these innate principles are activated; however, according to Herbert, Chomsky, and Lewis, Common Notions precede experience. Human reason is not the same as Common Notions. Reason is the “process of applying Common Notions” (Chomsky, 2009, p. 100):

In focusing attention on the innate interpretive principles that are a precondition for experience and knowledge and in emphasizing that these are implicit and may require external stimulation in order to become active or
available to introspection, Herbert expressed much of the psychological theory that underlies Cartesian Linguistics.

In Cartesian linguistics, Common Notions are equivalent to deep structures, which are dormant in the mind until stimulated by external input. This idea appears in 18th century Romantic thinking; Humboldt believed that “a language awakens in the mind from external conditions” (1999, pp. 43-44, quoted in Chomsky, 2009, p. 101). As a characterization of innateness, Chomsky claims that language comprehension is autonomous from other areas of cognition, including sensorimotor areas. He takes this idea from 17th century enlightenment thinking of René Descartes:

Nothing reaches our mind from external objects through the sense organs except certain corporeal motions…But neither the motions themselves nor the figures arising from them are conceived by us exactly as they occur in the sense organs….Is it possible to imagine anything more absurd than that all the common notions within our mind arise from such [corporeal] motions and cannot exist without them? (1648, CSM I, 304-305, quoted in Chomsky, 2009, p. 103)

Cognitive linguistics takes issue with the Cartesian philosophical approach to the study of mind and body. It focuses on the body’s role in shaping meaning. Lakoff and Johnson (1980), for example, challenged objectivism in Western philosophy and linguistics. They were the pioneers of an embodied approach to semantics in the early 1980s. At the same time, other work was being developed in computer science and psychology that had lasting impacts on the study of language and mind. These developments are discussed below.
1.2 Cognitive Semantics

There is a sharp divide between formal semantic research and cognitive linguistic approaches to the study of semantics. Cognitive semantics is a semantics that “arose within a Chomskian framework but which with time has developed an anti-Chomskian (and in particular anti-transformational) stance” (Albertazzi, 2000, p. 12). There are at least seven characteristics that differentiate formal semantics from cognitive semantics. In formal semantics (Albertazzi, 2000, p. 7):

1) Language can be described as an *algorithmic* system.
2) The linguistic system is *self-sufficient* and autonomous. No extralinguistic reference is required for its analysis.
3) Grammar, and particularly syntax, is an *independent* level of language.
4) Grammar is generative and is able to produce all the sentences of a language.
5) Meaning is objectively describable in terms of *truth conditions* by a logical-formal language (formalist assumption) whose rules are defined according to a principle of univocal coordination (the Traskian assumption).
6) Semantics is strictly compositional (the Fregean assumption) and of substantially less importance than syntax.
7) Phenomena like analogies, *metaphors*, radial concepts, and so on, are to be excluded from the analysis of language.

Cognitive semantics stands in opposition to the generativist paradigm in that it rejects the view of language as structured symbolic representations that are processed apart from other faculties of the brain. In contrast to formal semantics, cognitive semantics stresses that language is “[m]ore than an algorithmic system... language is a *means* to *conceptualize* and *express* human experience at various levels” (Albertazzi, 2000, p. 13). Cognitive linguists believe that language is a product of multiple modality
systems working in conjunction via neural networks. The embodiment of language remains a central concern in cognitive semantic research today. Lakoff reminds readers:

The structure of language uses the same devices utilized to structure cognitive models—image schemas, which are understood in terms of bodily functioning. Language is made meaningful because it is directly tied to meaningful thought and depends upon the nature of thought. Thought is made meaningful via two direct connections to preconceptual bodily functioning, which is in turn highly constrained, but by no means totally constrained, by the nature of the world that we function within…. there is no unbridgeable gulf between language and thought on one hand and the world on the other. Language and thought are meaningful because they are motivated by our functioning as part of reality. (1987, pp. 291-292)

In Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of the present work, I show how the tradition of embodied cognition can be applied to the study of creole languages and their multiple discourses that are embedded in sociocultural contexts.

Much of cognitive linguistics research is concerned with patterns of conceptual content and the various ways in which speakers express those patterns, or constructions, via syntactic structures, lexical items, and inflectional and derivational morphemes. We have a much more refined understanding of the ways in which humans structure categories like time, causation, and location than we did two centuries ago when Kant and Descartes were the authorities on philosophy of the mind. With respect to categorization of objects and events, especially noteworthy is the work of Charles Fillmore, who provided cognitive linguistics a much needed “Alternative to checklist theories of meaning” (1975). In his work on frame
semantics, Fillmore argued for an approach to meaning that acknowledged interconnectedness between concepts. In the present work, frames are framed as follows: “There are certain schemata or frameworks of concepts or terms which link together as a system, which impose structure or coherence on some aspect of human experience, and which may contain elements which are simultaneously parts of other such frameworks” (Fillmore, 1975, p. 123). This understanding of linguistic frame presupposes a familiarity with additional notions that were developed in the fields of psychology and artificial intelligence, namely *prototype* (Berlin & Kay, 1969; Rosch, 1973, 1978) and *schema* (Bartlett, 1932; Minsky, 1975; Rumelhart, 1980).

*Prototype.*

A prototype is an exemplar. Metaphorically, it serves as a central member of a radial category (see figure 1.1 below).

![Figure 1.1. Central and non-central uses of the ditransitive construction in English (reproduced from Goldberg, 1989, p. 81).](image)
Some members of a category are better representatives than other members because their attributes have clear connections to the most salient, stereotypical member of the category, that is, the exemplar; family resemblances to prototypes motivate membership in a category. The central sense A of the ditransitive construction in Figure 1 motivates extended uses of the construction in senses B and C, which contain verbs like *draw*, *paint*, *save*, and *promise* that are used to convey intentional and potential transfer of some object. Note, meanings of the verbs used in scenes B and C have little to do with transfer, but their employment in the ditransitive construction coerces the verb to mean intended or potential transfer (Hilpert, 2014, p. 17, citing ideas from Michaelis, 2004, p. 25).

Markedness is a concept that reveals considerable prototype effects. In general, the prototypical form in a category is the unmarked (neutral) form. The unmarked form is thought to be cognitively more basic and, generally, it serves as the prototype in the category to which it belongs (Lakoff, 1987, p. 60; Bybee, 2001, Chapter 3). Studies in phonology, morphology, and syntax consistently show that prototype effects are present in language use. In phonology, for example, phonemic categories have prototypical members, with one phone in the category serving as the prototypical member. Jaeger (1980) has shown that the phoneme /k/ in English is a category consisting of the phones [k], [k aspirated], [k’], and [k’ aspirated], but overall [k] is observed to be the prototypical member (cited in Lakoff, 1987, p. 61). Syntactic categories show prototype effects, as well. For example, active word order and topicalization strategies generally have prototypical properties that are realized in English via subjects and passive constructions. With respect to subjects, Bates-McWhinney (1982) argued that a “prototypical subject is both agent and topic” (cited in Lakoff, 1987, p. 64), and with respect to topicalization, “passives should occur
when the subject of the passive sentence *fails* to have one of the prototypical agent or topic properties” (cited in Lakoff, 1987, p. 66). Of the prototypical properties that subjects, agents, and topics have, the most notable include:

… volition (call it P1) and primary responsibility for the action (call it P2).

Correspondingly, passives can be used to indicate that an action was accidental (not P1) or to avoid placing responsibility on the person performing the action (not P2). Similarly, one of the topic properties of a prototypical simple active sentence is that the actor is already under discussion in the discourse (call this P3). Correspondingly, a passive may be used to introduce (not P3) the actor into the discourse, by placing the actor in the *by* -phrase. In this way, prototype theory enables Van Oosten to explain why the passive is used as it is. (Lakoff, 1987, p. 66, in reference to Van Oosten, 1984)

Joan Bybee has written articles and books that provide tremendous insights into the workings of the human mind with respect to exemplars and how they constitute prototypical forms that language users draw on to process and categorize linguistic units, for example, phonemes and inflectional morphemes. Vogel Sosa and Bybee (2008), for instance, provide a cognitive linguistic approach to clinical phonology that is particularly useful as an overview of usage-based accounts of markedness and emergent structure in English phonology.

*Schemas, idealized models, and domain(s).*

I draw an analogy to network modeling in artificial intelligence to illustrate more concretely what image schematic concepts are. Groups of interconnected neurons act in concert as they activate and inhibit each other. Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, and Hinton (1986) argued that “these coalitions of tightly interconnected units … correspond most closely to what have been called schemata” (p. 20).
Schemas are dynamic, learned inventories of information—also talked about in terms of acquired knowledge—that have structured, experiential bases. Schemas exist temporarily in a physical sense in the brain as assemblies of neural networks that form gradually in response to everyday experiences; the adage is “neurons that fire together wire together” (Shatz, 1992, p. 62; based on the work of Hebb, 1949). Schemas, which had been conceptualized in the classical tradition as configurations that were stored in memory, were redefined by Rumelhart et al. (1986). They asserted that image schemas were not memories any more than they were objective, identifiable patterns in the brain. Brain activity is fluid and dynamic. It would be inconceivable for image schematic patterns to be recurrent in a static way, a kind of constant in every human being’s brain. Rumelhart et al. (1986) stated explicitly what schemata were not:

Schemata are not ‘things’. There is no representational object which is a schema, rather schemata emerge at the moment they are needed from the interaction of large numbers of much simpler elements all working in concert with one another. *Schemata are not explicit entities, but rather are implicit in our knowledge and are created by the very environment that they are trying to interpret—as it is interpreting them.* (p. 20, emphasis added)

Multiple schemas and their shared inventories of information constitute the elements of a frame that Fillmore referred to in his quote above. What we understand schemata to be today are “a set of connection strengths which, when activated, have implicitly in them the ability to generate states that correspond to instantiated schemata” (Rumelhart et al., 1986, p. 21). Lakoff (1987) has claimed that these instantiated schemata are shaped by embodied experiences and help form “preconceptual structures” that we draw on to comprehend later experiences (p. 278). These ideas
from early literature on cognitive linguistics shaped the popular notions we have today about embodied cognition and the roles that preconceptual structures play in reasoning.

In place of Fillmore’s idea of frame, some cognitive linguists prefer the terms *idealized cognitive model, domain,* and *domain matrix.* Lakoff’s (1987) idealized cognitive model is characterized as idealized because it has a prototypical frame; it is not talked about as a generalized cognitive model because each model—or frame—has specific information that structures its components and their relationships to one other. Langacker (1987, Chapter 4; 2008, pp. 44-54) preferred the use of semantic domain to frame or script. Croft (1993, p. 340) and, more recently, Clausner and Croft (1999) argued that we draw on a collection of domains, or a domain matrix, when we interpret ideas and events. I use Croft’s terminology in this thesis.

Implicit in reference to domain matrix is an acceptance of an encyclopedic theory of lexical and phrasal semantics. A concept’s structure—that is, everything that makes up a concept—can be distributed among multiple domains. Furthermore, a concept can be defined relative to additional substructures within different domains. Croft put forward the concept domain matrix because he found that conceptual construal of meaning often relied on access to a collection of domains. I, too, am interested in processes of designation, which Langacker (2008, pp. 46, 66-70) calls profiling, that highlight specific substructures across multiple domains to understand how conceptual content emerges. A concept like *creole,* for example, activates a base domain LANGUAGE. In addition, the use of that word highlights conceptual content within an open-ended set of “nonbasic domains” (Langacker, 2008, p. 45). The nonbasic domains that are activated when one uses the profile *creole* include at least TYPE OF CODE, SOURCE, SPEAKER, TIME PERIOD, SETTING, and
ACTIVITY. Words like Haitian or Gullah designate a base concept of a particular language; the word Gullah is a profile and, as a concept, it is understood against a range of basic and nonbasic domains that contain presupposed encyclopedic information. The information that is highlighted across the various domains listed above include LANGUAGE as a base domain, and at least the following nonbasic domains:

- WEST AFRICAN LANGUAGES/ENGLISHES/AFRO-CARIBBEAN
- CREOLE/AAVE
- EARLY MODERN PERIOD
- SOUTHEAST COAST OF UNITED STATES
- PLANTATION ECONOMY
- AFRICAN-DESCENDED PERSONS

Domain highlighting across a domain matrix gives rise to a conceptual phenomenon called metonymy (for an overview of this assertion about metonymy in cognitive linguistics, see Dirven, 2003, pp. 14-15; see Lakoff, 1987, pp. 83-84 for an early discussion about metonymy that looks to radial structures). Croft believes that “an essential part of metonymy is the highlighting of an aspect of a concept’s profile in a domain somewhere in the entire domain matrix or domain structure underlying the profiled concept” (1993, p. 354). Metonymy is of central importance to language processing and production.

1.2.1 Metonymy.

Metonymic processing represents a central aspect of cognition. Domain highlighting, which is a key feature of metonymy, is pervasive in everyday language. We use metonymy in descriptions of actions, such as pass me the Heinz, and in reporting of events, as in Germany lost two games. It is not the company Heinz that I
ask you to pass, but the ketchup bottle that Heinz stands for as a metonymic vehicle. Similarly, it is not the geographical or political entity Germany that played and lost games, but a group of players that represents a target concept German team. An interpretation of a source word (vehicle) for a target word—or network of target words—is dependent on mental processing carried out by interlocutors who share an understanding of similarities and contiguous relationships between concepts in particular mental domains (Roudet, 1921). A referential nature constitutes the conceptual structure of metonymy. In Chapter 3, I will show two examples of metonymies that are propositional in nature, that is, there are elements in the metonym that rely on antecedent-consequent relations (Warren, 1999, p. 130). An example of this antecedent-consequent relation, which shows the characteristic of contiguity in concept domains that most cognitive linguists agree is at work in metonymic processing, is seen in the metonym deep creole, whereby the adjective deep is used in place of the adjective basilectal.

Table 1.1
Deep for Basilectal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>deep</th>
<th>adjective 1 stands for adjective 2</th>
<th>basilectal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISTANCE</td>
<td>DOMAIN 1 mapped onto DOMAIN 2</td>
<td>RESEMBLANCE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interpretation of deep as basilectal, and therefore unlike the lexifier, brings up the issue of metonymy versus metaphor. Of the conceptual domains that are highlighted in the lexical profile deep, DISTANCE (or DEPTH more specifically) is the most salient. Although metaphor and metonymy are at work in the expression deep creole, a deconstruction of the expression shows that metonymy is activated before metaphor. A speaker starts with the lexical item deep and from there we get a stands for relation
(adjective 1 for adjective 2), and then we have a cross-domain mapping: DISTANCE mapped onto the domain of RESEMBLENCE. Table 1 demonstrates these conceptual mappings.

Goossens explored the interplay of metaphor and metonymy in his work on metaphor-metonymy (1990). Hilpert (2007) addressed the metaphor-metonymy issue in his work on cross-linguistic comparisons of uses of body part terms in metonymic reasoning. Hilpert found that serial metonymies—metonymies that are embedded inside more abstract metonymies—are not based on metaphor; they have a contiguous structure that accounts for their referential and propositional nature. On the other hand, Hilpert believes that uses of body part terms to convey locative meanings like behind and temporal meanings like after rely first on metaphorical interpretations, which then allow one to arrive at a conceptualization of possession: an entity or event is understood to have a back, which then permits the use of the body part term to designate locative or temporal relations (Hilpert, 2007, pp. 94-95). Aside from grammatical uses of body part terms, uses of the body in expressions for abstract concepts like envy or scorn are associated mainly with metonymic reasoning.

1.2.2 Cognitive grammar.

Grammar is meaningful. In many cases, meaning determines the structure of a grammatical construction. Reduplication, for example, is a process that demonstrates the ways in which iconicity motivates the structure and meaning of a grammatical construction (Kouwenberg & LaCherité, 2003). The placement of a construction within a grammatical system also adds support for the existence of radial categories. This idea is known as ecological location (Van Oosten, 1984). About this idea, Lakoff states, “Constructions form radial categories, with a central construction and a number
of peripheral constructions linked to the center” (1987, p. 291; see Figure 1.1 above for a representation of central and radial uses of the ditransitive construction in English). An analysis of for constructions in Nigerian Pidgin supports Lakoff’s claims about radial categories and their extensions (Corum, 2015, Chapter 4). Lakoff believed that, metaphorically, grammatical structures were the basis for certain ICMs: “We can characterize the meanings of grammatical constructions by directly pairing the syntactic aspect of the construction with the ICM representing the meaning of the construction” (1987, p. 291). Interestingly, we even use image schemas to talk about processes of the mind, such as metaphorical mapping. For example, the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schema helps to describe not only the mapping of a physical experience to a conceptual space, but also how we believe the mind does such a mapping:

Table 1.2
PROXIMITY IS INTIMACY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>PATH</th>
<th>GOAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>take idea of proximity</td>
<td>to process mentally</td>
<td>understanding of intimacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lakoff (1987) claims that the spatialization of form hypothesis allows us to carry out metaphorical reasoning, and that this reasoning leads to idealized cognitive models (p. 283). Since idealized cognitive models depend on image schemas and imaginative capacities of the mind, such as metaphor, metonymy, and categorization, they ultimately provide us with the ability to think abstractly. We map these image schemas onto other domains where actions or events are understood in terms of properties of the image schema, as illustrated above with the PROXIMITY IS INTIMACY metaphor.
In Chapter 2 of the present work, I show how cognitive grammar can be used to analyze constructions that have motion verbs and the functional morpheme *for*. In most of the instances found in the small corpus of AEC consulted in Chapter 2, I noted that a verb could replace the morpheme *for*. The motivation for the study of motion verb + *for*, then, stems from the fact that speakers chose the bipartite construction over the single content morpheme construction—in this case the typical use of English verb *get*. Cognitive linguists have addressed this aspect of construction choice, as well. Langacker (2006), for example, argued that it is possible for constructions to have the same composite sense, while at the same time providing different semantic distinctions:

> Cognitive grammar defines the meaning of a complex expression as including not only the semantic structure that represents its composite sense, but also its ‘compositional path’: the hierarchy of semantic structures reflecting its progressive assembly from the meanings of component expressions. (p. 39)

In his discussion of salience, Langacker remarks that some constructions give more prominence to a profiled item in a domain matrix. He gives the examples of *pork* and *pig meat* to illustrate how two expressions can have the same composite value regardless of their different compositional paths. *Pork* is an unanalyzable, stored morpheme consisting of one semantic structure [PORK], whereas *pig meat* is a compound of two semantic structures. Both expressions have the same connotation, but the second expression differs from the first in that the individual components give prominence to substructures within the domain matrix. The expression *pig meat* makes salient the *from a pig* aspect of the composite value and, therefore, it gives most prominence to the source or provenance meaning. We will see that *retrieve/get*
and *come for* in Crucian grammar can be analyzed in a way that is similar to Langacker’s examination of enhanced salience of elements in a construction.

### 1.2.3 Conceptual metaphor theory.

Conceptual metaphor theory grew out of the Berkeley school of linguistics in the 1980s. Much of the study of metaphorical language up to that point had focused on conventional, poetic expressions. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) examined uses of language that could not be understood literally, for example, *to attack points in an argument*. They found that networks of lexical items associated with conceptual domains, in this case the item *attack* and the domain *WAR*, were used to talk about actions that evoked unrelated conceptual domains, here in our case ARGUMENTATION or DEBATE. The metaphorical mapping that links the two conceptual domains, then, is ARGUMENT IS WAR:

- It is important to see that we don’t just *talk* about arguments in terms of war.
- We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own. We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can abandon it and take a new line of attack. Many of the things we *do* in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war. Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle, and the structure of an argument—attack, defense, counterattack, etc.—reflects this. It is in this sense that the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is one that we live by in this culture; it structures the actions we perform in arguing. (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 4)

Lakoff and Johnson found that many of our common expressions are realized via metaphorical mappings across conceptual domains. The authors claimed that whereas
metaphors can be understood as both structural and orientational, they are always “grounded in correlations within our experience” (1980, p. 155). Structural metaphors, which Lakoff would later refer to only as complex metaphors in Lakoff and Johnson (1999), rely on perceived similarities between conceptual domains. In the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, aspects of competition are highlighted; therefore, similarities between actions of arguing and attributes of fighting become most salient. But, there is no real connection between an action like war, which is physical, and one like debate, which is carried out with words and ideas. Orientational metaphors, meanwhile, are based on experiential co-occurrences. Networks of vocabulary items referring to spatial orientations like UP-DOWN and NEAR-FAR are used to reason about concepts that have no orientational basis, for example, VALUE and AFFECTION. The metaphorical mappings between these conceptual domains are firmly rooted in co-occurrences of the events as they are experienced—these types of metaphors would later be referred to as primary metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; building on Grady, 1997), for example, INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS. An understanding of intimacy is not dependent on an understanding of NEAR-FAR; however, the conceptual domain PROXIMITY is activated during gestures of intimacy based on primary experiences, for instance when a mother holds her baby close to her body—this is also the ontological basis for the metaphor AFFECTION IS WARMTH.

Little research has been done in creolistics on semantics in African languages and Afro-Caribbean English-lexifier creoles using conceptual metaphor theory. And yet, the study of metaphor and metonymy in cognitive linguistics has revealed universal conceptualizations of thought that have been found in many typologically unrelated languages (Kövecses, 2005). Because it is believed that West African
languages played a substantial role in shaping the semantic systems of new English-
lexified varieties that emerged in Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Gambia, Cameroon, 
Ghana, and Nigeria (Polzenhagen, 2007; Wolf & Polzenhagen, 2009) and, similarly, 
that the indigenous languages of the Caribbean helped shape the creoles that emerged 
in the Antilles (Viada, 2008), I contend that West African and Indigenous Caribbean 
cultural conceptualizations be sought in AEC languages and cultures, as well.

1.3 Research on Creole Semantics: An Overview of Terminology and Current 
Trends

The study of semantics in pidgin and creole languages is lacking in 
comparison to research on creole morphosyntax and phonology. George Huttar’s 
work on creole semantics (1975, 1985, 1991, 2003, 2009) is an exception to this 
statement. In “Sources of creole semantic structures,” Huttar (1975) provided an 
account of the origins of borrowed morphemes and their semantic extensions in the 
Surinamese creole Ndjuka. While Huttar found that substratal effects from West 
African sources on Ndjuka during initial language contact in Suriname was the major 
factor in the establishment of what later became common semantic structures 
underlying root morphemes in that contact language, he additionally mentioned as a 
second predominant factor the “role played by language contact after the original 
 pidginization period” (1975, p. 694). Essentially, the second factor refers to adstrate 
effects, as Muysken and Smith (2015) and their co-authors described them in 
Suriname’s complex history of language contact. In the following section, I briefly 
discuss the terms substrate and adstrate as they are used in the present work. Then, I 
provide an overview of work that has been carried out in the field of creole linguistics 
and World Englishes whose authors have drawn on ideas from cognitive linguistics.
1.3.1 The use of substrate and adstrate today.

The terms substrate and adstrate are theoretical notions that refer to sociolinguistic profiles, on the one hand, and influences from languages that left morphosyntactic, semantic, and phonological imprints on contact varieties, on the other hand. Kouwenberg and Singler (2008) pointed out that while the term lexifier may be substituted for superstrate to avoid reference to linguistic prestige, unfortunately substrate has no replacement to circumvent reference to social factors that were linked to speakers, their languages, and the roles they played in contact language formation (see also Yakpo, 2017). Similarly, adstrate is framed in terms of sources of input that had equal or quasi-equal social standing with the languages that were present in a contact scenario; adstrate influence is seldom talked about in terms of system internal factors (Ansaldo, 2009, p. 112).

Substrate and adstrate influences are similar in that there are degrees of levelling and shifts toward dominant linguistic models from source languages in both cases of contact-induced change. In fact, the term adstrate is often added to the term substrate in discussions of language change in contact settings that are characteristic of cultural admixture and plurilingual educational practices, for example, in Melanesia and West Africa. Together, substrate and adstrate refers to the internal complex of contact-induced changes that occurred over the course of three centuries in Sierra Leone and that continue today in youth languages that have emerged in institutional settings of higher education in Ghana, Nigeria, and Cameroon (Corum, 2015). In the remainder of this thesis, I frame language shift in terms of prolonged contact-induced change in the context of adstrate and transient influences on emergent communicative systems in the context of substrate to better categorize linguistic sources of input in Afro-Caribbean settings. Hancock (1986, p. 92) essentially made
the same distinction concerning sources of input on Guinea Coast Creole in early Sierra Leonean and Senegambian contact settings:

With the coming together of speakers of different languages (the grumettoes) in environments now dominated by the creoles rather than the lancados, the transmission and the acquisition of the dominant language did not follow the pattern which obtained between the lancados and the Africans in the earlier decades. I propose that a base phrase structure emerged from the coming-together of a number of distinct linguistic systems [adstrate consisted of at least the Melle languages Baga, Temne, Gola, and Bullom, as well as coastal Mande and Kru languages], which retained shared features and discarded non-shared features.

In addition to sociolinguistic and system external references, Hancock suggests that adstrate also indicate the nature and degree of linguistic pressure on a contact variety. That variety is situated in changing typological matrices at different times in its history. Substrate influence indicates sources whose features were congruent across language boundaries during contact language formation, and adstrate influence indicates sources whose features converged with marked features in a developing contact language variety.

Finally, I note that substrate and adstrate are terms that are relative and speaker-specific. For example, what was at one time a substrate for some speakers in a community could have become an adstrate for another set of speakers at a later period. This was the case in Freetown, Sierra Leone in the first quarter of the 19th century, for example, when the typological matrix of that contact language’s ecology consisted of both endogenous and exogenous English-lexifier varieties and West African languages. Speakers were confronted with features from languages that had
held different social roles and exerted different degrees of pressure on the internal ecology at specific times in the language’s history: Temne, Sherbro, Wolof, Mande and Kru languages, and Portuguese-lexifier creole served as substrates on the variety referred to as Guinea Coast [English-lexifier] Creole (Hancock, 1986, p. 94). Later, a similar constellation but with additional pressure from Trelawny Maroon Creole, African American Vernacular English, and Benue-Kwa languages—notably Yoruba and Igbo—contributed features to the typological matrix from which modern Krio emerged. We should consider the latter sources adstratal, since speakers of those languages offered additions, omissions, and reconstructions of features to an existing vehicular English-lexifier creole of Freetown and the surrounding communities. In summary, those speakers drew on features in their linguistic repertoires when they used Krio, and their additions, omissions, and reconstructions are conceptualized here as externally motivated with respect to identity alignment (similar to shifts that occur in multilingual ecologies as described by Ansaldo, 2010, p. 620), but also internally motivated in terms of convergence patterns with dominant features in the contact language’s typological matrix. I have observed similar outcomes of adstrate effects in the Ghanaian Student Pidgin context (Corum, 2015, Chapter 3). St. Croix is another example of a setting in which adstrate sources exert pressure on a code that speakers choose from during communicative exchanges. LeCompte Zambrana et al. (2012) argue that plurilingualism and diverse network affiliations are two key factors to consider in the investigation of linguistic and identificational motivations for language choice in the Crucian sociolinguistic setting (pp. 45-46).
1.3.2 Applications of cognitive linguistics to Afro-Caribbean language and cultural studies.

Since the emergence of second wave cognitive linguistics in the late 1980s, there has been increased interest to capture social-psychological phenomenon that is linked to language use in creole contexts and other postcolonial settings. Mühlhäusler’s article *Metaphors others live by* (1995), for instance, praised Lakoff and Johnson for focusing on cultural and historical embeddedness of metaphorical language. Mühlhäusler reminded readers that we have a tendency to draw on our cultural models to make sense of discursive events. Underlying many of our cultural models are primary and conceptual metaphors that guide our reasoning. Chains of reasoning are not identical processes for every human being because the degrees of differences of human to human and human to nature relationships are vast. In the study of English as a world language or as an ex-colonial lexifier language, we must be aware of the roles that metaphor and metonymy play in the description and analysis of language as used by culturally and historically distinct communities of practice.

Polzenhagen and Dirven (2008) review conceptualizations that scholars hold of two dominant cultural models that are employed in the study of World Englishes: the rational model and the romantic model. The underlying conceptualizations of the two models lead to two very different positions on globalization processes and their effects on languages, speakers, and linguistic situations, for example, campaigns for bi- or multilingual reform in educational practices in Africa, and English-only metaphors that are used for political campaigns in monolingual-dominant cultures like the American Midwest. In general terms, the romantic model sees language as a medium for expressing cultural identity and extending cultural knowledge. The
rational model sees English as a lingua franca that can be used to bridge communication gaps between members of a globalizing world.

Wolf and Polzenhagen (2009) reject the deterministic view expressed by the romantic model. They argue instead that “cultural conceptualizations find clear expressions in L2 varieties of English” (p. 24), such as West African Englishes and AEC varieties. Speakers do not forfeit their “culture-specific conceptual system” when they employ an L2 variety (Wolf & Polzenhagen, 2009, p. 24). People in language contact scenarios in the Caribbean and in the Pacific switched from their L1 varieties to European-lexified varieties. Their conceptual systems, however, remained intact. Although eating-related metaphors and community-related metaphors exist in both Western varieties of English, West African Englishes, and AECs, Wolf and Polzenhagen argue that the extent to which they are employed in European and Afro-Caribbean varieties points to fundamental differences in their conceptualizations.

Andrea Hollington’s recent work (2015) investigates cultural continuities between West Africa and Jamaica. She looks to cultural conceptualizations and their manifestations in linguistic expressions and grammatical strategies in Jamaican. The three case studies presented in her book focus on body parts and their metaphorical and metonymic uses, elements of serialized verb constructions and conceptualizations of salient events, and kinship terms and their relevance to underlying cultural models, for example, mental models of family and community.

Abstract concepts that refer to events like knowing, feeling, and thinking are talked about in concrete terms with reference to the human body. Hollington characterizes the strategy of using body part terms to conceptualize emotions and feelings as semantic extensions, which have a metaphorical basis (2015, p. 101). When a source domain of a linguistic expression is apparent and cannot be interpreted
literally, for example, *fire in belly* in Ewe to refer to anger (Hollington, 2015, p. 97; adapted from Ayivi-Aholu, 1989, p. 29), then a metaphorical conceptualization or reading is appropriate. However, when abstract concepts draw on attributes of events that coincide with the feelings or emotions that one experiences during that event, a metaphorical interpretation is not entirely accurate. Hollington says of utterances that convey excitement, confusion, or derangement in Afro-Caribbean languages:

> while emotion metaphors involving body parts are often connected to culturally motivated ideas about the location of emotion within the human body, ideas about the seat of thinking, reason, cognition or consciousness can give rise to metaphors involving the respective body part. (2015, p. 98)

Hollington refers to what she believes is a metaphorical expression for derangement in Ewe that involves the face (*mo*) and the experience of pain (*ɖu*): *mo-è le ɖu-wo-m mà?* ‘are you nuts?’, ‘are you crazy?’ (Ayivi-Aholu, 1989, p. 40). I would draw a finer distinction here between what is metaphorical and what is metonymic. The co-occurrence of *mo* ‘face’ and *ɖu* ‘pain’ in Ewe suggests that metonymy is at work in this linguistic expression. We react to experiences like pain by expressing our discomfort, for example, through facial expressions; likewise, characterizations of deranged or demented persons have exaggerated facial expressions. The contiguous relationship between these profiled entities in the linguistic expression points to metonymy rather than metaphor. Hollington briefly brings up the issue of metonymy in her discussion of hand/arm polysemy in West African languages and Jamaican (2015, p. 110), but immediately changes focus to expressions in Jamaican that she refers to as metaphorical character traits as expressed by body parts and adjectival modifiers (pp. 111-123). The work from Farquharson (2012) is cited repeatedly within this section to draw attention to expressions of *greed, stubbornness,* and
flattery in Jamaican that have parallel structures in West African languages. Like most scholars, including Alleyne (1980, p. 115) and Holm (1988, p. 86), Hollington continues to characterize cognitive processes as metaphorical when, in fact, they have a metonymic basis. Chapter 3 of the present work distinguishes metaphor from metonymy, but shows how they work in conjunction in the expression of abstract concepts in AECs.

Hollington’s case study on kinship terms in Jamaican reveals cultural conceptualizations that have emerged as linguistic manifestations of group identity markers—for example as indexical items of a particular family or community. The conceptualizations also manifest in high frequency word forms, which have been found to reveal the presence of a particular cultural model. Hollington’s kinship study was motivated by the work of Polzenhagen (2007). This work identified key lexical items and uses of collocations in West African varieties of English to posit an underlying “African community model” that is dominant in the Anglo-Cameroonian language situation (Polzenhagen, 2007, p. 119, pp. 149-153).

Nordlander (2007) identified metonymies that exist in Krio expressions. This work is one of the only studies in creolistics that has had as its main focus the role of metonymy rather than metaphor in language use. Nordlander (2007) found that the lexical items *bij* ‘beef’ and *bush* ‘shrub, bush’ are used in Krio to create complex metonymic configurations, including part-for-whole, whole-for-part, and category-for-member of the category (p. 285). The various metonymic senses of these two concepts led Nordlander to conclude that Krio speakers widen and expand the semantic scope of their existing vocabulary items instead of borrowing additional, particular English vocabulary.
1.4 Conclusion

One aim of this work is to determine whether constructions in AECs show a closer resemblance to features of U.S. American English or to the constructions that are found in languages of the Afro-Atlantic sprachbund (Muysken & Smith, 2015). Corpus linguistics is ideal for this type of study, for “corpus-linguistic analyses are always based on the evaluation of some kind of frequencies, and frequency as well as its supposed mental correlate of cognitive entrenchment is one of several central key explanatory mechanisms within cognitively motivated approaches” (Gries, 2009, p. 2). The corpus of AEC used in this work has shed insight on grammatical patterns of phrasal verbs and serial verb constructions in general. The next chapter is one of a handful of studies that have adopted a cognitive linguistic approach to examine grammatical constructions in creole languages (Hollington, 2015; Lefebvre & Lambért-Brétière, 2015; Levisen & Aragón, in press).
Chapter 2

Cognitive Grammar and Creole Semantics: Insight on the Verb/Preposition Interface in Afro-Caribbean English-lexifier Creoles

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I use a cognitive semantic framework to examine the verb/preposition interface in Afro-Caribbean English-lexifier creole (AEC). Important to a usage-based approach like the kind used in cognitive semantics is a reliance on actual language data. Langacker (1987) made this point explicit: “Substantial importance is given to the actual use of the linguistic system and a speaker’s knowledge of the full range of the linguistic conventions, regardless of whether those conventions can be subsumed under more general statements” (p. 494). My interest is not so much in what speakers can potentially say in their languages, that is their competencies, but rather what they actually do with their languages, that is their performance strategies.

I have used a specialized corpus of AEC to study grammatical and lexical uses of *for*. The data in the corpus are composed of recordings that were transcribed by the St. Croix court system in the early 2000s. I have converted the transcriptions into accessible text (.txt) files to enable a concordancing program, for example AntConc 3.4, to conduct key word in context (KWIC) searches of the files and to identify the most frequent constructions. Although the data was obtained in St. Croix, the corpus is not representative of Crucian in general. The data contain linguistic examples produced by persons from St. Croix and other areas of the Caribbean region who
speak varieties of AEC. Also, most of the persons are males between the ages of 18 and 30. Therefore, the conclusions drawn in this work reflect broad claims about features and uses of AEC. Special thanks is given to the English Department of University of Puerto Rico for providing access to the data (see Vergne, 2008, for a discussion about this data and an insightful reflection on its use for linguistic purposes).

2.1.1 The northeastern area of the Atlantic Sprachbund: A profile of Crucian.

Crucian is the dialect of AEC that is spoken on St. Croix, one of three U.S. Virgin Islands in the eastern Caribbean region. It shares characteristics with the other AECs of the Leeward Islands of the Lesser Antilles (Aceto, 2004). Crucian is spoken alongside two other dominant languages, U.S. Virgin Islands English and Spanish. Spanish is spoken on the island because of its close proximity to Puerto Rico and the smaller islands east of Puerto Rico, Culebra and Vieques. The large proportion of foreign nationals residing in St. Croix makes it difficult to identify a language that is unequivocally Crucian (Cooper, 1983; Holm, 1989, p. 456). The idea that there is a monolithic entity that is Crucian is questionable, in fact. The linguistic data that was consulted for the present study is best thought of as an amalgam of AEC varieties.

Recent demographics and immigration patterns in St. Croix.

The United States Census Bureau (2013) reported that there were 106,405 people living in St. Croix in 2010. Approximately 2% of that population (2,203 people) placed themselves within the category two or more races; most affiliated with a single category, such as black or African American (~77%), white (~15%), and other (~6%). Another category that Crucians selected was Hispanic or Latino (18,504
people chose this category). Note, the census reports that of the 36,942 Crucian residents who were born in Latin America and elsewhere in the Caribbean (see Table 2.2 below), only 8,316 were Hispanic or Latino. This means that the other 77.5% of that Caribbean population is non-Hispanic/non-Latino and, therefore, comes from an area where Afro-Caribbean French-lexifier or English-lexifier creoles are spoken. Those members make up the foreign component of the Crucian sociolinguistic situation, although foreign may be an incorrect characterization, as commonalities exist throughout the greater Caribbean region (Muysken, 2008, pp. 11-20).

Table 2.1

Native Virgin Islanders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Birth: Us Virgin Islands</th>
<th>Black or African American</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Other races</th>
<th>Two or more races</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Croix</td>
<td>20,851</td>
<td>1,409</td>
<td>2,379</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>25,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Thomas</td>
<td>21,338</td>
<td>1,751</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>23,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. John</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42,575</td>
<td>3,182</td>
<td>2,860</td>
<td>1,102</td>
<td>49,719</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Data taken from 2010 U.S. Census Data (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013).

Table 2.2

Non-native Virgin Islanders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Birth: Outside of the Us Virgin Islands</th>
<th>Black or African American</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Other races</th>
<th>Two or more races</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean*</td>
<td>32,446</td>
<td>1,471</td>
<td>2,378</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>36,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>5,518</td>
<td>10,463</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>16,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>1,502</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>2,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38,333</td>
<td>13,464</td>
<td>3,788</td>
<td>1,101</td>
<td>56,686</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. *Latin America and the Caribbean includes Puerto Rico and Navassa Island. Data taken from 2010 U.S. Census Data (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013).
The data from the tables above indicate that a sizable portion of the Black or African American demographic of the 2010 St. Croix population comes from islands where AECs are spoken. Mitchell (2010) has written at length about the French-lexifier speaking community in St. Croix. The census also reports that 28,041 people speak a “language other than English,” most of whom are between the ages 35 and 65; almost a third of these persons (8,541) are representative of the French or French creole-speaking population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013, Table 2.9, Language Spoken at Home and Ability to Speak English).

Approximately 12% of the 106,405 people living in St. Croix do not hold citizenship (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013, Table1.5, Citizenship). The majority of those people who are not U.S. citizens have permanent residency on the island, however. A little more than 25% of the 93,465 people who are classified as U.S. citizens in St. Croix have gained citizenship status through U.S. naturalization processes. The year of entry of those persons who were born outside of the Virgin Islands rose dramatically compared to previous decades. There were 10,202 “foreign born” emigrants who entered St. Croix from 2000 to 2010, somewhat fewer than the 11,175 persons who entered the island from 1980 to 1999. That same period saw a population increase of 10,123 native born persons: “anyone who was a U.S. citizen or a U.S. national at birth. This includes respondents who indicated they were born in the United States, Puerto Rico, a U.S. Island Area (such as the U.S. Virgin Islands), or abroad of American (U.S. citizen) parent or parents” (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014, p. B-5). This is much more than the 6,445 native born persons who entered the island between 1980 and 1999. The other 18,641 people who were not born in the U.S. Virgin Islands had been living in St. Croix before 1980, and they claimed non-native, or “foreign born” status (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013, Table 1.5, Year of Entry).
Summary.

As I noted earlier in this chapter, Crucian is spoken alongside Spanish, varieties of U.S. English, and at least 4 different creole varieties of the Eastern Caribbean that are spoken on the island, according to U.S. census data from 2000 and 2010. In addition to the effect that immigration patterns have had on the development of a Crucian language, the advent of mass media, Internet, and podcasts and the accessibility of such mediums of communication have further expanded and widened the linguistic options that speakers have and directly affect what constitutes the Crucian creole continuum. The Internet enables Crucians to chat via online forums with persons from different parts of the world and to download TV shows and music from different countries. This has impacted Crucian culture at the very least. Music from Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, for example, have had a substantial effect on Virgin Islands music (Nugent, 2010).

Notes on the corpus.

In the literature on corpus linguistic studies, one finds two broad descriptions of corpora: balanced and specialized. A balanced corpus represents the language as spoken by the homogenous language community. The construction of a specialized corpus focuses on speakers of the language, their styles, registers, and the text types that are used when the language is spoken. The present study makes use of a specialized corpus of AEC. The text comes from transcriptions that were produced from phone conversations of residents of St. Croix to permanent and temporary members of an extended Afro-Caribbean creole speaking-community. The conversations were recorded in the early 2000s via wiretapping and published as wiretap linesheets in 2006 by the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The data
is referred to as the Crucian Wiretaps Corpus (CWC) in this work.

The transcriptions are property of the court in St. Croix, but special permission has been given to the English Department at the University of Puerto Rico to use the transcriptions for academic research on Crucian. I first took the line sheets of the wiretap transcriptions and transferred them into accessible text (.txt) files. I then used the concordancing program AntConc 3.4.3m for Macintosh OSX, developed by Laurence Anthony in 2014, to search the files and to generate a comprehensive word list. The results displayed the linguistic constructions that are most frequently used in the corpus. The collocations and clusters for the specific constructions are also accessible for analysis. Appendix 1 contains sets of the constructions come for (including forms came and coming) and go for (including forms gone, going, and went) from the CWC data.

_A prominent morpheme in the CWC: For in motion verb constructions._

The following sections detail the semantic range of a construction that contains a motion verb (MV) followed by the morpheme for, or the MV for construction. The first section focuses on constructions containing the motion verb come plus the morpheme for. The second section looks at go plus the morpheme for. I do not call for a preposition in this work because I do not want to assume a priori a category for specific elements in the grammar of Crucian or other AECs.

To review instances of the MV for construction in the CWC, I first discuss the semantics of come for and go for using U.S. English as a point of reference. Then, I provide examples of the uses of the constructions in the corpus. Idiosyncratic uses of for and other morphemes that convey verbal meanings are apparently noteworthy, as English dictionaries and thesauruses have seen the need to draw attention to collocational uses of such lexical and functional items, too. The _Cambridge Advanced_
Learner’s Dictionary, for example, provides non-native speakers with uses of the MV for construction: Your father will come for (= to collect) you a 4 o’clock (Walter, Woodford, & Good, 2008, p. 271). The editors of the dictionary found it necessary to make explicit reference to the idiosyncratic, verbal use of for in this context. In this thesis, it is argued that the functional item takes on a verbal meaning when it co-occurs with a motion verb. I observe in the CWC data that speakers prefer the insertion of for as a dominant V2 marking strategy.

The statement above about collocations and how they give rise to new meanings and idiosyncratic uses of words is not a controversial issue in cognitive linguistics. This point is made clear in Croft (1999): “many cognitive linguists, in particular Talmy and Langacker, argue that various grammatical elements or constructions have as their chief ‘meaning’ a particular conceptualization of the experience denoted by the lexical item found with the grammatical element or construction” (p. 410). Below, I will show how Langacker’s ideas about morpheme selection and semantic value can be applied to the MV for construction. First, I comment on Talmy’s extensive work on phrasal verb constructions (1991, 2000, 2007), since this is what Croft refers to in his quote above.

Phrasal verbs are highly productive verb constructions that make use of content morphemes and functional morphemes. The grammatical morpheme is called a satellite in Talmy’s work. It is believed that these satellites add semantic features like duration, manner, path, and change of state to phrasal verb constructions as a whole. Examples include hang on and move out, in which the satellites on and out indicate duration and path, respectively. Talmy has shown that “satellites in English are mostly involved in the expressions of [p]ath” (2007, p. 141). A cursory search of the CWC yields an extensive list of different phrasal verb constructions. Similar to
English, the constructions contain morphemes that add semantic content to motion verbs. The verb *link* in the CWC was used to mean ‘connect’, as in, *link [connect] you with him*. With an added morpheme, as in *link you back*, the meaning shifts to ‘reconnect’. Talmy (2007) considers affixes like *re*-satellites, too (p. 155). In the CWC data, there are no instances in which speakers use affixes to add an additional meaning to *link*, in this case the meaning being an irrealis *connect again at some time*. We mostly find instances in which morphemes co-occur with verbs. We might say, then, that speakers in the CWC prefer analytic satellites over bound derivational forms. Although English has derivational morphology, it still uses satellites extensively. Nevertheless, the satellites and their composite semantic values in phrasal verb constructions in the CWC are sometimes at odds with the typical meanings ascribed to their counterparts in metropolitan Englishes. Shanklin, La Russo, and Corum (2016), for example, found that the phrasal verb *rip off* is used in the CWC in ways that are not found in U.S. American English. As for the cases in which *for* co-occurs with a motion verb in the CWC, I found that *for* behaves like a verb, or at least a verbid. Like satellites in phrasal verb constructions, I argue that *for* increases the valency of the motion verb, provides a purpose value, and adds an aspectual sense to the constructional meaning. Hopper (2008) provides a similar examination of *take* constructions in English.

Returning to Langacker’s ideas, the selection of a morpheme in a grammatical construction has the potential to render a specific profile on an event. Langacker (2006) has shown that “when we use a particular construction or grammatical morpheme, we thereby select a particular image to structure the conceived situation for communicative purposes…. Grammatical constructions have the effect of imposing a particular profile on their composite semantic value” (p. 41). Langacker
gives the example of the dative alternation in English, which he believes does not derive from a common deep structure, but rather gives interpretations of two possible construals of the same event: *Bill sent a Walrus to Joyce vs. Bill sent Joyce a Walrus* (2006, p. 42). In the first instance, the morpheme *to* makes the path–or exchange–of the Walrus prominent, whereas in the second instance, possession of the walrus is in focus by juxtaposing the two nominals.

In the CWC, it was found that the morpheme *for* is regularly used in place of the verb *get*. Roy (1975) contains an instance of U.S. Virgin Islands creole that shows this tendency as well: *I goin fo’ mi cutlash to chop dese disgustin’ weed* (p. 66). From a Langackerian perspective, *MV for* is employed when speakers wish to profile the *purpose* substructure in the composite semantic value that is conveyed by the grammatical construction. If speakers were to use *get*, the *acquisition* substructure would be profiled. Instead, speakers choose the morpheme *for*, which adds prominence to the purpose value. Bringing Talmy’s insight into the discussion, it is also seen that the morpheme *for* adds aspectual content to the overall constructional meaning. The aspectual reading is performed on the fly. That is, *MV for* is processed simultaneously in relation to the other constituents that co-occur with it, not only syntactically, but also in terms of the meanings conveyed by those units. Ultimately, pragmatic analysis determines the interpretation of *MV for*.

### 2.2 The *MV For* Construction

The meaning of the *MV for* construction draws on a conceptual structure of CHANGE, a concept which we understand as a result of our embodied cognition (see Varela, Rosch, & Thompson, 1991, for an overview of the terms enaction and embodiment). The construction uses the [+movement] value of the verbs *come* and *go*, for instance, and then it receives a [+purpose] value from the functional item *for*. 
Since movement and purpose entail some process of change and, as a result, acquisition, the prototypical sense—of composite semantic value in Langackerian terms—of $MV$ for is referred to in this paper in terms of CHANGE (‘Change’). Interestingly, the come for construction can have a change of state meaning or a change of location meaning. This makes the construction polysemous. It is not surprising that come for is polysemous in its meanings of change of state and change of location, for there is a primary metaphor entrenched in English in which we understand states as locations. The fact that we comprehend sentence (1) below is proof of the existence of the metaphor in English:

1) **The country is in an economic depression.**

We use the locative preposition in to metaphorically talk about a country’s depressed financial state. This cannot be taken literally, however, since it is impossible to be physically located in an abstract state like depression.

In both standard and colloquial U.S. English varieties, come for and go for can be expressed in additional ways. U.S. English varieties use the $MV$ and $V$ construction, for example, come and get the money, or the $MV$ $V$ construction: go get your sister. Unlike U.S. English, however, which favors $MV$ and $V$ or $MV$ $V$ to colloquial come for or go for (see corpus data below), speakers of AECs are more likely to use an $MV$ for construction to express a change of state/location meaning than the other two alternatives, according to the computerized corpus (CWC) that was used for this study.

Looking only at the use of come for, we find considerable differences between metropolitan Englishes and AEC. In the combined 5.5 million word LONDON-LUND (LLC) corpus of spoken British English of the 1960s to the 1990s, the
Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen (LOB) corpus of written British English of the 1960s, the Freiburg-LOB (FLOB) corpus of written British English of the 1990s, the BROWN corpus of written American English of the 1960s, and the Freiburg-Brown (FROWN) corpus of written American English of the 1990s, there are only 57 uses of come for (including forms came and coming). On the other hand, in that same massive body of spoken and written English there are more than 100 uses of a come and V construction, for example, come and get the check, come and pick it up, come and take a look, and come and have a glass of sherry. In the CWC, a specialized corpus that is 20 times smaller than the combined corpora, there are 92 uses of come for (including forms came and coming). A handful of those 92 instances are translations of the creole by a court official; notwithstanding, the St. Croix appointed transcriber still chose to use MV for in the glosses instead of MV infinitive or MV and V. This is indicative of a recurring pattern in Virgin Island language use in general.

Before we look at instances of come for in the CWC, I analyze the meanings of the construction using U.S. English as a point of departure.

2.2.1 Come for.

Come for is not uncommon in colloquial U.S. English. The following example illustrates the high frequency use of come for as a fixed expression:

2) Come for drinks on Saturday. (Walter, Woodford, & Good, 2008, p. 431)

The functional morpheme for is used to convey a purposive meaning. The sentence type is imperative, so the mood of the speaker must be jussive, or commanding (Lyons, 1977, pp. 745-752). The speaker encourages the listener to get drinks with her. The schema for the construction could be: come [MOVE_toward speaker [i.e., with speaker]] + for [IN ORDER TO [i.e., purpose of event]]. Yet, there is still the
semantic composite value Change, in the sense of acquisition, to take into consideration. The first meaning that one thinks upon hearing (2) is *come in order to partake/experience*. I do not have the feeling that *come in order to collect the drinks and leave* is the meaning that the editors of the *Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary* want to convey with this expression. In terms of aspect, then, (2) focuses on *the process of acquiring*, giving it an imperfective, durative sense. It is assumed that the agent will undergo some change of state by going to or experiencing the event. What happens after the event is not conveyed in the meaning of this particular sentence.

However, a different meaning can emerge from the use of *come for* in colloquial U.S. English, as the following example shows:

3) *I’ve come for your census form.* (Walter, Woodford, & Good, 2008, p. 271)

The meaning of this construction is *come in order to collect your census form and leave*, not *come in order to collect your census form and stay*. The aspectual sense of this meaning is completive.

From the examples given above, I posit two aspectual meanings that can be associated with *come for* in colloquial U.S. English: an imperfective, durative meaning, as in (2), and a perfective, completive meaning, as in (3). Although the semantics of *come for* are divided between a perfective sense and an imperfective sense, the construction has, nonetheless, a composite semantic value Change. In the imperfective use, there is a focus on change throughout an event, whereas in the perfective use the focus is on completion of change, that is, the end of the event. To this I add that pragmatics plays an important role in the meaning intended by the use
of *come for*. The following examples will help illustrate the polysemy of *come for*, as well as the role that pragmatics plays in the final meaning intended by the speaker:

4)  *Freddy came for me!*

The prototypical meaning of (4) is one in which Freddy Krueger, a character from a horror film who kills teenagers in their dreams, came to my location in order to hurt, haunt, terrorize, or kill me, basically any verb that would entail a change of state for the patient. We will call this [+change of state] meaning ‘Change_sta.’ In addition to this [+change of state] meaning, an additional meaning can emerge from (4). This is the [+change of location] meaning ‘Change_loc.’ The values of the two meanings are listed below:

- **Change_sta meaning** [+change state, +durative]
- **Change_loc meaning** [+change location, +completive]

However, Change_loc is not the meaning that a U.S. English speaker will associate with (4) when she initially hears it. Change_loc entails that Freddy came to my location and took me with him to another location. Again, change of location is a possible interpretation of (4), for it entails [+CHANGE], which is the prototypical sense of Change, but it is not the meaning that a U.S. English speaker immediately thinks of when she hears (4). The meaning that one first associates with (4) is Change_stta. In fact, to achieve the Change_loc meaning in (4), U.S. English speakers are more likely to use the Standard English *MV and V* construction or the *MV infinitive* construction instead of the colloquial *come for* construction². Thus, to get

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² The Change_loc meaning of the come for construction can be used interchangeably with the MV and V construction and the MV infinitive construction. To use those alternative constructions for the Change_sta meaning, however, sounds contrived.
the Change_loc meaning in which Freddy intended to take a person to another
location, one is more likely to use:

5) Freddy came to get (abduct) me!

In (4) above, it is my background knowledge about the movie character Freddy
Krueger and the frame semantics that are evoked by his character, that is knowledge
about his history as a serial killer and the typical end result of his actions, that help me
draw a conclusion concerning which Change meaning is appropriate for come for in
that instance. Pragmatics ultimately determines the choice of Change_sta or
Change_loc meanings.

Finally, we note that to avoid ambiguity meaning Change_loc is often realized
in a construction like (5), in which come for is replaced with an MV and V
construction or the MV infinitive construction in U.S. Engishes. This is not the case in
AEC. The CWC has more instances of MV for than the MV V construction or the MV
infinitive construction.

In conclusion, come for has a composite semantic value Change. There are
differences, however, in the intended meanings of the construction. We draw the
following generalizations over the two meanings of come for based on examples (2-5):

Change_sta generalization: come for implies change of state;
  for adds purpose [+durative] value

Change_loc generalization: come for implies change of location;
  for adds purpose [+completive] and, therefore, acquisition value
Although two meanings of Change emerge from the use of *come for*, background knowledge about the agents and patients in the construction will ultimately determine which meaning the construction will take.

*come for in the CWC (including forms came and coming).*

In the CWC, *come for* is used more frequently than the *MV and V* construction, like *came and got*, or the *MV infinitive* construction, like *came to get*. Most of the uses of *come for* in the CWC have a Change_loc [+completive] meaning. The speakers refer to a final state of the patient, and *for* marks the purposive meaning of the composite semantic value Change. The following example provides a sentence taken from the CWC along with its equivalent in U.S. English:

6)  *Weh you deh, you want me come for it? (CWC, come for, hit 7)*

Where are you? Do you want me to come and get it?

In order to increase the valency of the verb *come* in U.S. English, a speaker would need to use 1) a preposition, 2) the conjunction *and*, or 3) an infinitive verb like *to get*. The translation of the creole example into U.S. English above shows this. However, since the creole is more likely to use the *for* morpheme after the motion verb *come*, it makes one wonder what grammatical relation *for* serves in the *MV for* construction.

As stated above, the *MV and V* and *MV infinitive* constructions are in complimentary distribution with the Change_loc meaning of *come for*. This leads one to conclude that *for* in this particular construction in both creole and colloquial U.S. English should be treated as a verb. If *for* is a verb in this construction, that would mean that *come for* is in both function and form similar to a serialized verb construction.
Not all uses of *come for* in the CWC have a Change_loc [+completive] meaning. A Change_sta [+durative] meaning can be seen in the following example:

7) …*that's wah they gou come for alone*  
   (CWC, *come for*, hit 40)

That alone will make them come (i.e., act).

In this context, the speaker refers to the motivation that the police may have to come to his house. An arrest is not implicit in this excerpt. The speaker meant that the police will come in order to search [+durative] for something. Below is an additional case of the [+durative] aspectual meaning of *come for* as found in the CWC:

8) …*they eh gah no reason to come for me they striking blow*  
   (CWC, *come for*, hit 91)

…they don’t have any reason to harass me; they are striking blows.

Overall, however, the most common uses of *come for* in the CWC had *retrieve* or *acquire* meanings. In those cases, *for* conveyed a purposive/acquisition value, as it did in example (3) above of colloquial U.S. English. In (9) below, the construction has a Change_loc [+completive] meaning:

9) *I could come for you.*  
   (CWC, *come for*, hit 5)

I could come and get you [bring you back to the house].

The final example in (10) provides evidence to the argument that *for* in the MV for construction provides a purposive meaning and works similar to V2 verbs in serialized verb constructions in West African languages and AECs:
10) *I wah know if they gou come for a warrant for me?* (CWC, *come for*, hit 19)

I want to know if they are going to (try?) to get a warrant for me.

Similar to the example in (7) above, *for* adds both a purposive meaning and an aspectual sense to the construction in (10) that cannot be traced back to the motion verb alone. In the following section, I turn to uses of *for* as it co-occurs with the motion verb *go*. It will be seen again that *for* adds a purposive meaning to the composite semantic value Change in MV *for* constructions.

### 2.2.2 Go for.

Linguists are hesitant to admit whether U.S. English has serialized verb constructions (Goldberg, 2006, p. 52), insisting instead that a phonologically reduced or even covert *and* appears between two verbs in a V1-V2 English construction (for an overview of generative grammar approaches to this phenomenon, see Wulff, 2006, pp. 104-106). Yet, it was shown above that *for* works similar to *get* in that it profiles the *acquisition* value of a Change of state or location meaning in the MV *for* construction in the CWC data. This morpheme is verbal in nature, similar to satellites in phrasal verb constructions and second verbs in serialized verb constructions in West African languages (Shanklin, La Russo, & Corum, 2016). Similarly, *for* in *go for* should not be seen as a preposition. Possible uses of *for* as a preposition in U.S. English include:

a) benefactive - *Go for your team* (Go so that you benefit your team).

b) durative - *Go for two days* (Go over a period of two days).

c) motion toward - *Go for one mile* (Go in that direction one mile).
The purposive meaning of *for* in (a) comes closest to the kinds of meanings rendered by *go for* in the CWC data, but it fails to provide any sense of *acquisition*, which is what the morpheme profiles in the following example:

11) *I just going go for the girl to move it.* (CWC, *go for*, hit 10)

Look, I am going to go pick up the girl to move it.

In example (11), *go* provides the motion value and *for* profiles the purpose value. Since there is also a retrieve/acquisition meaning, the composite semantic value of *go for* is understood to be Change_loc. Most uses of *go for* in the CWC rendered a Change_loc [+completive] meaning.

*Go for* is not uncommon in U.S. English, either. It is used in many fixed expressions and can have dozens of meanings. Some of the variations of this construction and their equivalent expressions are provided in Table 2.3. The list of expressions is not meant to be exhaustive. Out of the 15 different meanings that are provided, only a handful appear in the CWC. On the other hand, the most common use of *go for* that appears in the CWC does not appear once in the Frown or Brown corpora. This is significant for a number of reasons. First, *go for* is not a productive construction in U.S. or British Englishes. It is an expression with various fixed meanings. In order to achieve the fixed meaning, the expression must be employed in the right context. Second, a U.S. English speaker must use two verbs to express the prototypical meaning of *go for* as found in most cases in the CWC, for example:

12) *I’ll go for Levi in 10 minutes.*

In both examples, an MV *infinite* construction or an MV and V construction is used in place of the MV *for* construction.
Table 2.3

*Go For* in U.S. English (Including *Came, Going, and Went*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expression</th>
<th>Meaning and Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Go for the gold!</em> (try to win the highest medal)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Go for a million!</em> (attempt to win a million)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Go for broke!</em> (attempt to accomplish... using all of your skills)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>He's going to go for it!</em> (He is going to attempt...)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>She went for it.</em> (She believed...)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>I went for the weekend.</em> (I traveled and stayed somewhere)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>I could go for a beer.</em> (I want to consume a beer)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>They went for a walk.</em> (They left to walk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Girls like you don’t go for guys like me.</em> (You are not interested in me)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Finally, he went for the jugular.</em> (He made an attack on the jugular vein)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Do you want to go for a ride?</em> (Do you want to ride in my car)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Charles is my gofor (go for).</em> (Charles is the person that runs errands)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>It’s going for 25 bucks a pop.</em> (It is selling at a price of 25 dollars each)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>That’s when I went for my gun.</em> (That’s when I withdrew my gun)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Uses of *go for* in the examples above are based on examples of the *go for somebody/something* entries in Walter, Woodford, & Good (2008, p. 615).

In the following sections, I look into this prototypical use of *go for* that is preferred by members of the Afro-Caribbean creole-speaking community who were recorded in the CWC.

*go for in the CWC (including forms going, gone, and went).*

The morpheme *for* is used in *go for* to convey a purpose value in the Change_loc [+completive] meaning, which in most cases refers to an event in which a subject collects an animate or inanimate object. The first instance of *go for* is used in
a description of an event in which a person requests that someone collect individual [X], and the second example references the acquisition of an inanimate item:

13) *I wan you go for [X] right right now, right?* (CWC, go for, hit 6)

Listen, I want you to pick up [X] right now, okay?

14) *I could go for it you know, me aint going use my car* (CWC, go for, hit 9)

I could go and get it; I am not going to use my car.

Speakers insert grammatical markers before *go for*, as well:

15) *You done went for General?* (CWC, go for, hit 53)

Have you picked up General yet?

*Go for* in the examples above convey purposive constructions, but they are different from the serial verb constructions that Hollington reviews in her work on V1, V2, and V3 event structure and cultural conceptualizations in Jamaican and African languages (2015, pp. 149-151). They are also unlike the purposive constructions that Kouwenberg (1994) describes for Berbice Dutch and Guyanese Creole (pp. 307-315), and do not resemble the constructions that Sabino (2012) provides in her discussion of verb serialization in Virgin Islands Negerhollands (pp. 174-180). In the CWC data, *for* does not precede a verb; the construction only occurs before noun phrases. Still, the construction conveys a purposive meaning that is associated with Change_sta, as seen in examples (16) and (17):

16) *in the morning them man went for them [drugs]* (CWC, went for, hit 9)

in the morning the guys went [to the house] to look for the drugs.
I am going out with my girl and we are going to have dinner.

In (16) and (17) above, *for* works as a V2 element that profiles a purpose value and adds an aspectual [+durative] sense of Change related to a specified event, in these cases *searching* and *dining*. Reviewing the two uses more closely, however, it becomes apparent that *go for* is used ambiguously by these speakers. The speaker in (16), for example, could also use *for* to express a purpose value, but [+completive] meaning: *guys went to steal the drugs*. In (17), the speaker might have wanted to say: *we are going to buy dinner [and come back]*. This kind of ambiguity between the durative and completive senses of *for* is not surprising. Multiple meanings and functions are often associated with single morphemes in West African and AEC languages. The speakers’ choices of a functional morpheme like *for* instead of a lexical verb like *search or steal* adds additional support to the argument that polysemy and multifunctionality are features that creole language users employ to cultivate ambiguity in discourse (Faraclas et al., 2014). These are possibly inherited discursive features from West African languages. Indirection, triadic communication, and other oratory skills, for example through proverbs, aphorisms, and parables, are distinct modes of communication among many West African communities (Tarr, 1979, Yankah, 1995; Ameka & Breedveld, 2004). In Chapter 5, I discuss this discursive strategy as a complex feature of AEC semantics.

In conclusion, most instances of *for* in MV *for* constructions in the CWC provide a purpose value that leads to a *retrieve or acquisition* reading. Notwithstanding, *for* can be used in complex ways to profile a purpose value that
renders both a Change_stal [+durative] meaning and a Change_loc [+completive] meaning:

18) nobody suppose to know when he going for a hotel (CWC, going for, hit 1)

no one really knows when he will book/stay at a hotel.

19) if ain't for you, I going for nothing for no body me son (CWC, going for, hit 16)

if it weren’t for you, I’d be nothing at all.

In (18), for profiles the purpose value and, therefore, acquisition reading in the event book a hotel room, but it implies a stay in the hotel room, as well. Example (19) is more interesting. Go(ing) does not provide a stative sense to the MV for construction; it provides a movement value, as it has in many of the other examples reviewed in this chapter. The movement is metaphorical, however. For is used by the speaker in (19) to indicate a purposive meaning, which together with the metaphorical use of go renders a compulsion reading. Yet, the combination of the motion verb and for renders a non-compositional, Change of state meaning that is captured by the verbs be or exist in the English translation. West African English-lexifier pidgins use for in this way in de for constructions (Corum, 2015, Chapter 4).

2.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I reviewed the various ways in which MV for constructions are used by a particular community of practice in St. Croix. I analyzed their instantiations in the mixed AEC recorded in the CWC and compared those uses with equivalent
translations in colloquial U.S. English. In most of the translations into English, it was noted that a verb with an acquisition value in its meaning, such as get, could be substituted for the morpheme for.

The analysis of for in English has not been looked at through the lens of serialized verb constructions. It may be because linguists are hesitant to admit that U.S. English has serialized verb constructions, like go-V versus go-and-V (Wulff, 2006, p. 102), and insist instead that a phonologically reduced or even covert and appears between two verbs in a construction like go [and?] get your brother. Based on the examples found in the CWC, I maintain the position that for in MV for constructions increases valency of the motion verbs come and go, provides a purpose value, and adds an aspectual sense [+completive] or [+durative] to the constructional meaning. These functions typify serialized verbs in West African languages and AEC languages, where serialized verbs, auxiliaries, adpositions, adverbs, and ideophones constitute frequently overlapping categories with fuzzy and porous boundaries between them.
Chapter 3


3.1 Introduction

Creolization is conceptualized in this work as processes of linguistic and cultural creativity that are in direct correlation with enduring linguistic and cultural heritages. It is a complex phenomenon that has provoked arguments among scholars in the field of creolistics since its earliest days (Muysken & Smith, 1986). When inserting creole as an adjective to describe a particular language that resulted from creolization, Michel Degraff is careful to use an atheoretical, language-external, and socio-historical meaning for the notion (2005, p. 541). I recognize the importance of socio-historical contexts that are embedded in genesis scenarios of creole languages, and that without a dialogue about such socio-historical perspectives we have only a partial view of how creole languages emerged. In addition to analyses about the social and historical accounts of creole genesis, we also need to focus on a neural theory of language in the creole context, or what happens in the brain when human beings draw on linguistic means to communicate (Feldman, 2006; Evans, 2016). This chapter gives special attention to the processes inherent to the human mind that assist in the creation of any form of communication. Rather than purely novel forms of language creation, it may be more appropriate to describe processes of creolization that occur during scenarios of language contact as processes of linguistic creativity and cultural continuity:
The kind of creativity demonstrated by Afro-Americans is probably a legacy of Africa…. African and Afro-American music, story telling, language, dance, and games can likewise be analyzed in terms of inventiveness within a tradition. (Alleyne, 1993, p. 179, emphasis mine)

Cognitive semantics for creole linguistics stresses importance of the creativity of language users and their abilities to invent new uses for old items. The approach is aligned with Faraclas (1988), when he says:

The most important forces underlying the dynamic nature of pidgin and creole studies are the strength, resilience, and creative capacity of creole speakers and their cultural and linguistic traditions, which have allowed the speakers of these languages not only to survive against incredible odds, but creatively to use their cultural heritage to play an active and essential role in shaping what is called ‘contemporary western culture’ or ‘modern life.’ (p. 134)

Cognitive semantics for creole linguistics draws on empirical data to support the argument that creole languages are not exceptional languages. It underscores the fact that speakers utilize the creative capacities that are shared by all humans when faced with the task of constructing a language. Such an approach is concerned with tracing the metaphorical and metonymic conceptualizations that exist in Afro-Caribbean English-lexifier creoles (AECs) back to universals of human cognition; the same factors of cognition are at play in creoles’ substrates, adstrates, and superstrates, which can sometimes make the search for substrata or superstrata versus universals an unproductive endeavor (Mufwene, 1986).
3.1.1 Polysemy and the creole lexicon.

The field of creolistics does not lack examinations of lexico-semantic contributions from substrates on creole word formation. In the study of AECs, for example, many creolists agreed with Holm when he said:

The influence of African languages was relatively limited in terms of the number of actual words, exceeded by adstrate borrowings in many cases…but the impact of the African substrate pervaded the entire lexicon in its effect on semantics, as well as calques on compound words, idioms, and reduplications – and quite likely subcategorizational rules. (1988, p. 89)

Lefebvre (2001) remarks on the more than three hundred multifunctional lexical items in Valdman, Yoder, Roberts, and Joseph (1981), a comprehensive dictionary of Haitian Creole. She discusses the adoption of those functional items from underspecified lexical entries in the substrates; in the case of Haitian, those sources were Gbe languages like Fon and Ewe. Similar patterns of polysemy in the lexicon are described in Heine and Leyew (2008) in their discussion of Africa as a morphosyntactic area. In an earlier work, Heine drew attention to the multifunctional nature of items that range from lexical uses to grammatical structures, for example, from a verb to a subordinating conjunction, as observed below in the uses of bé ‘say’ in Ewe (1986, p. 7, originally in Hünnefemeyer, 1985):

The full verbal function of bé is present in (2a), while bé may be used as either a verb or, if followed by the synonymous verb gbliɔ, as complementizer in (2b) and (2c), respectively. Finally, in (2d), bé acts exclusively as a complementizer introducing object clauses:
Heine reminds readers that there are often inadequate interpretations of grammatical notions from one language to another in grammar manuals and other reference works of West African languages due to the continuum–or multifunctional–nature of grammaticalization: “notions like ‘word category’ or ‘constituent class’ may be artificial entities which are inadequate for defining the exact grammatical status of the linguistic units concerned” (1986, p. 8). Similar arguments have been made with regard to word classes in creole languages. Holm says of Miskito Creole, “[i]t is not surprising that multifunctionality was quite widespread [in creole grammar] and many words took on different or additional syntactic functions” (1988, p. 103). Adjectives, for example, comprise a distinguishable class in European-lexifier languages like English, French, and Dutch. In West African languages like Fongbe, Yoruba, and Nigerian Pidgin, meanwhile, there is not a clear boundary that separates adjectives from verbs or nouns. Words that appear to be adjectives in Nigerian Pidgin, for example, often function like verbs (Faraclas, 1996, p. 60). Similarly, words that appear to be prepositions in Fongbe and Yoruba are verbal in character and origin; the
same can be said of a functional item like for in Nigerian Pidgin (Corum & Mazzoli, 2012) and in Crucian (Corum, 2011; Chapter 2 of the present work).

Reduplication of words is another case in which functional polysemy is evident in a creole lexicon. Reduplication can result in word class shift. Atlantic creoles and their West African substrates and adstrates share this characteristic in terms of word formation processes and conceptual construal (Aboh, Smith, & Zribi-Hertz, 2012). For example, reduplication of loya in Nigerian Pidgin, derived from the noun lawyer, has shifted from a noun to a verb loya loya ‘to deceive’. In Jamaican Creole, the reduplication of a verb can result in an adjectival construction that conveys a resultative meaning, that is, the end state of the verb: beg-beg means ‘borrowed’ in Jamaican Creole, for the state of begging for an item often results in the transfer of the item (Kouwenberg & LaCherité, 2003, p. 10). Another way to talk about instances of polysemy in conceptual construal is to invoke metonymy.

3.2 Conceptual Construal: Scripting the Body

Scripting the body to convey abstract concepts for use in multiple linguistic domains, such as spatial domains and temporal domains, can be found in many of the world’s languages (for a set of typologically different languages that have been reviewed for their uses of body part terms and metonymic phenomena that result in grammatical coding, see Enfield, Majid, & van Staden, 2006; Hilpert, 2007). Authors Felix Ameka and James Essegbey have published numerous book chapters and journal articles that detail the ways in which West African speakers conceptualize spatial relations in Gbe languages of the Kwa group in relation to their bodies and their surroundings, for instance in Ewe, by using nouns like sky, belly, mouth, and head to refer to topological notions like upper surface, inside, edge, and top, respectively. Essegbey (2005) has shown that the Surinamese creoles have similar
nominal-derived spatial elements in locative predicates. As Essegbey’s study demonstrates, the semantic/morphosyntactic aspects of some AECs can be traced back to particular substrate languages and cultures of a West African region. Huttar, Essegbey, and Ameka (2007) and Smith (2015a, 2015b, 2015c) suggest that there are hundreds of items in Atlantic creole lexicons whose origins can be traced back to West African sources. It must be stressed, however, that in addition to pattern replication (Matras, 2009), metaphor and metonymy played an important role in the emergence of form-meaning pairings in contact languages. A universal in language genesis—not just for creoles or mixed languages, but hypothesized for all known languages—includes mental mapping of body part terms to convey abstract concepts. Radden and Kövecses contend (1999, pp. 45-46):

Our basic human experience relates to concrete physical objects, which have more salience for us than abstract objects… Body parts make particularly ‘good’ objects, and we routinely access various abstract human domains by reference to our body. Special subcases of the CONCRETE OVER ABSTRACT principle may be described as BODILY OVER EMOTIONAL (heart for ‘kindness’), BODILY OVER ACTIONAL (hold your tongue for ‘stop speaking’), BODILY OVER MENTAL (brain for ‘intellect’), and BODILY OVER PERCEPTUAL (good ear for ‘good hearing’).

Most of the research on creole semantics has been concerned with tracing instances of polysemy in AECs back to their African substrates (for an overview, see Farquharson, 2012). One can find extensions of the belly in contact languages in Cameroon and South America, for example, and in non-creole West African languages, too. One of the meanings of belly in Cameroonian refers to the part of the body that contains the stomach and bowels, but it follows other African languages in
extending the concrete notion to mean “appetite, hunger, pregnancy, internal parts, seat of emotions, secret place, secret” (Holm, 1988, p. 102; originally in Schneider, 1960). Creole languages of Suriname extend the use of belly to refer to the inclusion of members in a closed unit or family. Sranan has bèe and Ndjuka uses bee: they belong to the same clan [insert bèe or bee ‘belly’ for clan]; they have a recent common ancestor, and so belong to the same family [insert bèe or bee ‘belly’ for family]; they belong to the same nuclear family [insert bèe or bee ‘belly’ for family] (Alleyne, 1980, pp. 117-18).

Identifying pattern replications from source languages is crucial to determine which actors were involved in contact language formation. Concerning processes of semantic broadening, Holm concluded, “the large number of extended meanings of the word for ‘belly’ in a number of English based creoles suggests that some of the polysemy of pidgin lexicons may be retained in certain items of their creole descendants” (1988, p. 102). In fact, we know which African languages in particular display idiosyncratic uses of body part terms to convey abstract concepts and, because speakers of those languages were at the right places at the right times, it is evident that those sources were involved in establishing the use of body part terms for ears, for example, to mean stubbornness (Parkvall & Baker, 2012; Muysken & Smith, 2015). But, discussions about the motivation for the use of ears to mean stubbornness in creoles and their source languages is unaccounted for in studies that look at conceptual construal in creole word formation.

With respect to the use of belly to refer to pregnancy, there are admittedly many languages in the world that show this meaning extension (Hilpert, 2007, p. 88). Speakers arrive at the ‘pregnant’ meaning of belly through cognitive processing of a number of chained metonymies, or “common sequences of conceptual steps that lead
to lexical and grammatical meaning” (2007, p. 79). The end result of those conceptual steps is what I refer to as conceptual construal in the present work, and both metaphor and metonymy are at work in processes of conceptual construal. I return to Hilpert’s notion of chained metonymies below. Here, I comment on Hilpert’s (2007, pp. 88-89) discussion of the metonym CONTAINER FOR THE CONTAINED that he found to be extended to mean offspring in two languages that he surveyed, Basque and Tahitian. Hilpert believes that the secondary metonym involved in this understanding of belly for offspring is CAUSE FOR EFFECT, as offspring are the result of pregnancies. This chaining and linking of lexical items and their meanings is a natural characteristic of human cognition. The role of “human semantic potential” (Regier, 1996) should be highlighted in studies on word formation and creole etymologies, especially in work that claims to assuage reservations concerning the unexceptional nature of contact languages.

In this chapter, I show that lexicalizations of abstract notions like fear, loathing, greed, and scorn in AECs are carried out via metonymy and metaphor. Although speakers calqued the expressions on similar constructions in the creoles’ substrates, interpretations of those expressions was (and still is!) achieved through the imaginative capacities of the mind that we as humans possess. Similar phenomena occur in the creoles’ lexifiers and in languages that were not part of contact language formation in the Atlantic. The ‘family’ meaning of belly in the creoles mentioned above is similar to the ‘offspring’ meaning in Basque and Tahitian, but even closer to an extended meaning in Hausa, which Hilpert notes in his section on body parts and grammatical extensions. In Hausa, belly has been grammaticalized and works as an inclusive marker that translates roughly in English as ‘member within a set’ (Hilpert, 2007, p. 92). Hausa speakers arrive at this interpretation through a number of
conceptual steps that are achieved through both metonymic and metaphorical processes—although, it was noted in section 1.2.1 that metaphor precedes metonymy in grammatical coding. This concept of chained metonymies in cognitive linguistics has proven to be helpful in the identification of lexical extensions (Hilpert, 2007, 2010). I will show its relation to conceptual construal in a set of AECs below.

3.2.1 Chained metonymies.

Hilpert views chained metonymies as metonymies within metonymies. For example, in the utterance, *Martin gave an interesting paper*, speakers understand that *paper* stands for ‘ideas’ because they make use of the metonym MATERIAL FOR WHAT MATERIAL REPRESENTS. But, as Hilpert points out, the metonym works on another metonymy that is embedded in its structure: MATERIAL FOR RESULT OF THE USE OF MATERIAL (*paper* stands for ‘writing’, and *writing* stands for ‘ideas’); this embedded metonym is brought to light in the linguistic example *Martin found an error in his paper*, that is, *in his writing*. In the first utterance, we understand that *paper* stands for ‘ideas’ because we understand that ideas are expressed in writing and, moreover, that writing is done on paper. The chained metonymies approach to metonymic processing is beneficial because it offers a model of cognitive processing that is constraint-based. To propose that intermediate metonymies exist in a chained metonymy, one must provide evidence that those embedded metonymies exist in actual language use. This results in an empirical approach to analyses of metonymy.

Hilpert proposes two constraints on chained metonymies. The first addresses polysemy in language. The fact that a metonym can have alternative meanings suggests that multiple concepts are activated in its utterance. The multiple interpretations of the vehicle (item_1 in the *deep creole* example in Chapter 1) are
constrained, however, by the number of metonymies that are embedded in its structure. Hilpert draws on natural data from the British National Corpus to review uses of the expression to keep an eye on NP to make his point (2007, p. 81). The phrase with the vehicle eye is used to stand for the actions see, watch, and want. The conceptual sequence that occurs in the DESIRE interpretation involves the activation of VISION and ATTENTION, respectively, for we first see and, then, watch that which we want. The chained metonymy is represented schematically as eye → vision → attention → desire (Hilpert, 2007, p. 81).

The second constraint that Hilpert proposes on chained metonymies involves an implicational hierarchy. In a cross-linguistic study on chained metonymies, we should be able to predict a given metonym’s extensional range (Hilpert, 2007, p. 81): [I]f a language has a meaning extension of the body part term eye to the concept ‘desire’, the body part term should also have been extended to the meanings of ‘vision’ and ‘attention’. If these extensions are absent, the chained metonymy is doubtful.

I propose a similar account of contiguity and relatedness of concepts in the activation of mental domains and argue for its application to the study of conceptual construal in AECs. We will see below, however, that there are breaks in certain metonymic chain models that must be accounted for and that seemingly problematize studies of chained metonymies that adhere to a strict linear approach.

3.2.2 Metonymy and calquing.

Instances of metaphorical extension and metonymic reasoning have been described in the literature as calques on structures in West African substrates (Parkvall & Baker, 2012). To express ‘greedy’ in many AECs, speakers say big eye.
Holm referred to *big eye* as a metaphor and found that its use is common in West African languages, too, for example in Twi and Igbo (1988, p. 86). West African influence on Bahamian Creole is apparent in the use of the metonym *putting mouth on it*, which means ‘to curse it’; there are parallels in Yoruba with *ẹnu rẹ* and in Twi with *n’ano*, both mean ‘his mouth’ and express the notion of cursing (Alleyne, 1980, p. 87). Similar expressions are found in AECs that use body part terms to convey abstract notions, for instance, *greed, stubbornness, and anger*:

**Saramaccan**  
*taânga yési* ‘stubbornness’, lit. **strong ears**;  
*háti bóónu* ‘anger’, lit. **heart burn**; *káti wóyo* ‘scorn’, lit. **cut eye**

**Sranan**  
*tranga yesi* ‘stubbornness’, lit. **strong ears**;  
*bigi yay* ‘greed’, lit. **big eye**; *drey yay* ‘boldness’, lit. **dry eye**;  
*koti yay* ‘scorn’, lit. **cut eye**

**Krio**  
*tranga yesi* ‘stubbornness’, lit. **strong ears**;  
*big yay* ‘greed’, lit. **big eye**; *dray yay* ‘boldness’, lit. **dry eye**;  
*kot ay* ‘scorn’, lit. **cut eye**; *kray bele* ‘to complain’, lit. **cry belly**

**Jamaican**  
*trang ed* ‘stubbornness’, lit. **strong head**;  
*big ay* ‘greed’, lit. **big eye**; *dray ay* ‘boldness’, lit. **dry eye**;  
*kot ay* ‘scorn’, lit. **cut eye**

**Trinidadian**  
*haad ez* ‘stubbornness’, lit. **hard ears**; *big ay* ‘greed’, lit. **big eye**;  
*kot ay* ‘scorn’, lit. **cut eye**; *bras fes* ‘boldness’, lit. **brass face**;  
*mout* ‘boastfulness’, lit. **mouth**;  
*swit mout* ‘flattery’, lit. **sweet mouth**;  
*got mout* ‘curse’, lit. **goat mouth**;  
*ban ɗɔ* ‘to resolve’, lit. **band jaw**
Guyanese  

Gullah  

Figure 3.1. Greed, stubbornness, anger, and flattery in seven AECs (adapted from Alleyne, 1980, pp. 115-116, bold added).

Hilpert (2007) found that the ORGAN OF PERCEPTION FOR PERCEPTION was a common metonym in his cross-linguistic survey of body part terms in metonymic expressions (pp. 86-87). The data from the languages in Hilpert’s survey also showed that body parts for perception are often extended in the use of PERCEPTION FOR ATTENTION. The two most frequent body parts that were used for this metonym were *eyes* and *ears*. Hilpert concluded that meanings such as attention, or lack of it with respect to disobedience and disregard, are results of chained metonymies: disobedience can be linked back to hearing, which can be linked back to the organ for hearing. Rather than claiming chained metonymies for the additional extension of *eye* or *ear* for ‘jealousy’ and ‘greed’, however, Hilpert calls these uses “lexical extensions” (2007, p. 87), but in all cases there is still a metonymic basis. Those lexical extensions could not be characterized as chained metonymies since the languages in which they were found did not use the embedded metonym ORGAN OF PERCEPTION FOR PERCEPTION, as well. Speakers of those languages make a conceptual jump from body part terms to expressions that convey emotional concepts.

In the remainder of this chapter, I provide a provisional examination of the most frequent uses of *eye* in the English-lexifier creole examples in Figure 3.1. I refrain from positing chained metonymies in these languages since I have not been
able to identify uses of embedded metonymies that would link the lexical extensions back to the body part terms. Also, as these expressions are composed of two items—one modifier or one verb plus one body part term—I also suggest that metaphorical mappings and image schema transformation are at work in the construction and construal operations of these concepts.

3.3 Eyes and Ears in Linguistic Expressions of Greed, Contempt, Confidence, Affection, and Stubbornness in English-lexifier Creoles

The lexicalization of abstract notions like *confidence, contempt, greed,* and *stubbornness* in AECs occurred naturally via metonymy and metaphor. Although speakers calqued the expressions on similar constructions in the creoles’ substrates, construal of the meaning of the expressions is achieved through the imaginative capacities that we as humans share. Similar phenomena occur in the creoles’ superstrates and in languages that were not part of contact language formation in the Atlantic (see Enfield, Majid, & van Staden, 2006; and Hilpert, 2007).

The expressions that are analyzed in the sections below should be seen as single units, as opposed to separable compositional items in a syntactic construction. For example, Braun (2009) believes that metonymies like the ones in Surinamese creole examples in Figure 3.1 look like ADJ-NOUN phrases on the surface, but should “rather be regarded as nouns because they exhibit syntactic, semantic and functional properties typical of nouns” (p. 176). It should be noted, as well, that these kinds of expressions are often characterized as noun phrases and as modifiers of noun phrases in Thomas Russell’s Etymology of Jamaican Grammar and in Cassidy and Le Page’s (1967) dictionary of Jamaican.
3.3.1 Big eye.

The first expression that I examine in this paper is *big eye*. It is attested in six of the seven AECs that are listed in Figure 3.1. The metonymic meaning of the construction comes from the use of *eye* to stand for ‘covet’. The conceptual domain that is activated by the lexical profile *eye* is VISION. At the same time, though, *eye* highlights other items in various conceptual domains, as the item’s use is understood in terms of a frame, that is, its various antecedent-consequent relations with other items that exist in a collection of domains (this is called a domain matrix in Croft, 1993). The linking extends all the way to concepts such as DESIRE and CONTROL.

The modifier *big* is used metaphorically to mean ‘intense’. This involves a mapping from a source domain SIZE to a target domain FORCE; it is natural to talk about intensity in terms of size since there is a direct correlation in experience between mass and weight. Together, *big eye* provides a conceptual construal that glosses literally in English as FORCEFUL DESIRE/CONTROL.

Cassidy and Le Page provide an example of *big eye* in their dictionary of Jamaican: *Big-eye people nubba is fe satisfy in dis wol* (1967, p. 41). In this case, the expression is a modifier of a noun phrase. Winer (2008, p. 80) lists examples of *big eye* as a modifier in Trinidadian. The expression is classified as a verb for some English-lexifier creoles, as in “(to be) covetous, greedy” in San Andrés and Providence Creole (Bartens, 2013, p. 134). There is an inversion of the modifier expression in Trinidadian: *buh you eye big eh, why you doan leave some of de tings fuh somebody else* (Ottley, 1981, p. 78). Allsopp mentions the inversion of the expression as a modifier in numerous AECs, and also gives examples in which the construction is used in the possessive, for example, “have (too much) big eye” and as
a fixed expression in *big eye choke dog* ‘unthinking greed can easily embarrass you’ (2003, p. 99).

Table 3.1

*Big Eye (Greed in AECs)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collocational item</th>
<th>Mental activity</th>
<th>Conceptual domains</th>
<th>Referential meanings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>eye</td>
<td>metonymy</td>
<td>Body part → VISION → ATTENTION → DESIRE/CONTROL → ATTRIBUTE</td>
<td>covet -see -watch -take/hold -greedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>big</td>
<td>metaphor</td>
<td>SIZE → FORCE</td>
<td>big is strong -(exerts pressure, occupies space)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other expressions that convey *greed* in AECs include *long eye* ‘covetous’, *red eye* ‘envious’, and *strong eye* ‘domineering or pretentious’ (Parkvall & Baker, 2012). The metonymic uses of *eye* remain the same in these examples. The modifier that accompanies the noun activates a particular metaphorical meaning in the different expressions. In *long eye*, the conceptual domain DISTANCE is activated by the lexical profile *long*. Prolonged attention is conveyed by the verb *dwell*. The *prolonged* meaning is realized via a conceptual mapping from a source domain DISTANCE to a target domain DURATION; duration entails intensity, as well. This is seen in the English expression, “I long for you,” in which *long* means ‘yearn’.

*Red eye* is similar to both *big eye* and *long eye* in that it means ‘envy’ or a similar emotion. The metaphorical basis for this is a conceptual mapping from a source domain HEAT to a target domain FORCE. *Strong eye* also relies on the metonymic use of *eye* for DESIRE. Like *big eye, long eye*, and *red eye*, FORCE is activated by the use of the modifier *strong*, as strength exerts force.
3.3.2 Cut eye.

The next most common expression that uses eye in the AECs that are listed in Figure 3.1 is cut eye, which means ‘scorn’. Eye is extended to stand for ‘contempt’ in those expressions. One will focus on an entity (object, event, person) if she decides that it is worth her attention; lack of focus, attention, or vision will indicate that an entity is not worth further consideration. This is how cut plays a role in conceptual construal.

The use of cut in the expression introduces dynamic imagery or fictive motion (Talmy, 2000) to the constructional meaning. I propose that a LINK image schema, or schematized pattern of experience, is the base from which a metaphorical interpretation of the expression is achieved. We understand that an emotional link becomes established between entities that are admired or respected; the opposite is true of scorn. The meaning of cut eye is achieved via an image schema transformation of LINK; the verb cut transforms LINK to its converse SEPARATION.

Table 3.2
Cut Eye (Scorn in AECs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collocational item</th>
<th>Mental activity</th>
<th>Conceptual domains</th>
<th>Referential meanings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>eye</td>
<td>metonymy</td>
<td>Body part</td>
<td>contempt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>VISION</td>
<td>-see</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ATTENTION</td>
<td>-watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>WORTH</td>
<td>-focus/not focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cut</td>
<td>image schema transformation</td>
<td>LINK (\rightarrow) SEPARATION</td>
<td>sever</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-detach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-drop (attention)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The verb cut works in combination with the metonym in the following way: a conceptual link between two entities entails unity; when a conceptual link between
two entities is severed, a drop in attention follows and the entity under consideration is no longer perceived to be worthy of consideration.

In Crucian, *cut eye* is used as a verb: “I ain’ know wha’ it is I do da gu’l but she cuttin’ eye at me all de time” (Roy, 1975, p. 66; reproduced in Sterns, 2008, p. 22). In addition to West African sources, it is probable that English motivated the use of *cut eye* in Crucian. Sterns (2008, p. 22) points readers’ attention to the use of *cut[ty] eye* in early modern English: “to look out the corner of one’s eyes, to leer, to look askance. The cull cutty-eyed us; the fellow looked suspicious at us” (originally in Grose, 2014 [1788], p. 106). The existence of the construction in a variety of English does not indicate that superstrate speakers’ speech was the one and only model for the construction in Crucian or other English-lexifier creoles listed in Figure 3.1. The superstrate model reinforced the model that was in place in the substrate input, or vice versa. Even more important to include in that convergence scenario is recognition of the creative capacities of the human mind. Conceptual construal is part of human cognition and works in conjunction with the linguistic system, for example, the lexicalization of body part terms to convey abstract notions and to express grammatical relationships (Evans, 2016).

### 3.3.3 Sweet eye.

The expression *sweet eye* is not particular to any one AEC or variety of English. The *Oxford English Dictionary* contains collocations involving *sweet* and *eye* that date as far back as the 16th century. Parkvall and Baker (2012) list the expression *bad eye* in their collection of potential calques and semantic borrowings in AECs (p. 233), which is the opposite of *sweet eye*; English uses *stink eye* or *evil eye* in similar ways.
Table 3.3

Sweet Eye (Tender Glance in AECs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collocaional item</th>
<th>Mental activity</th>
<th>Concepts</th>
<th>Parts of speech</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>eye</td>
<td>metonymy</td>
<td>Body part \rightarrow VISION \rightarrow ATTENTION</td>
<td>glance -see -watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sweet</td>
<td>metaphor</td>
<td>TASTE \rightarrow AFFECTION</td>
<td>sweet -positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both metonymy and metaphor are at work in *sweet eye*, although there are studies that suggest that certain languages have a preference for metonymy rather than metaphor in this expression and others that convey similar concepts (Kövecses, 2005, p. 257). Kövecses refers specifically to Charteris-Black (2003), which is a study of metaphors versus metonyms in conceptual construal in English and Malay. In Table 3.3, I claim that *eye* stands for ‘glance’ in the expression *sweet eye*. We arrive at that metonymy through the extension of ORGAN FOR VISION, and then VISION FOR ATTENTION; we look at entities that draw our attention. With respect to metaphor in the conceptual construal, a source domain TASTE is used to conceptualize a target domain AFFECTION. Again, this cross-domain mapping is not particular to AECs or to their West African substrates and adstrates. Many of the world’s languages have expressions that suggest conceptual mappings of source domains TASTE and SMELL to target domains of AFFECTION or its converse ANGER.

3.3.4 Dry eye.

In Figure 3.1 above, Sranan, Jamaican, and Krio use the expression *dry eye* to mean ‘bold, audacious’. Cassidy and Le Page (1967) included an inversion of the expression in their dictionary of Jamaican: *gýal yu ai dráí laik páach-káan* ‘Girl, your
eyes are as dry as parched corn’ (p. 161). Table 3.4 deconstructs the construal of dry eye.

Table 3.4

Dry Eye (Boldness in AECs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collocational item</th>
<th>Mental activity</th>
<th>Concepts</th>
<th>Parts of speech</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>eye</td>
<td>metonymy</td>
<td>Body part ➔ VISION ➔ ATTENTION ➔ ATTRIBUTE</td>
<td>shame -look with eyes -maintain eye contact -no fear/shame (bold)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dry</td>
<td>metonymy</td>
<td>END STATE stands for EMOTIONAL STATE</td>
<td>absence of tears -indication of no remorse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An expression like dry eye shows the kind of oblique transparency that can be observed in conceptual construal in creoles. Although there are some matches in expressions for emotions in English and the AECs, others are foreign to idiomatic or fixed expressions in the lexifier. Farquharson stresses that “we cannot ignore the presence of some body-parts which are either not lexicalized in the lexifier or are unanalyzable words…. Along those same lines, we can recognize the presence of compounds whose semantics are not that transparent, at least from a European perspective” (2007, p. 27). The opposite expression teary-eyed can be interpreted as shameful or remorseful in English and does not sound too contrived, but its converse dry-eyed does sound odd; there is only one attestation of dry-eyed in the BROWN corpus of English.

3.3.5 Strong ears.

Another expression found in the Surinamese and West African creoles is strong ears. Similar to the dry eye collocation, this combination of items is peculiar
to Englishes spoken in the United Kingdom and the United States. Jones (1971) comments that Krio speakers who have had formal educations mix the *strong ears* expression into their regional English: *you are too strong ears* ‘You are too stubborn’ (p. 76).

Table 3.5

*Strong Ears (Stubbornness in Sranan, Saramaccan, and Krio)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collocation</th>
<th>Mental activity</th>
<th>Concepts</th>
<th>Parts of speech</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ears</td>
<td>metonymy</td>
<td>Body part</td>
<td>ear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>( \rightarrow ) HEARING</td>
<td>-hear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>( \rightarrow ) ATTENTION</td>
<td>-not listen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>( \rightarrow ) ATTRIBUTE</td>
<td>-stubborn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strong</td>
<td>metaphor</td>
<td>STRENGTH ( \rightarrow ) DURABILITY</td>
<td>strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-impervious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-unyielding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Parkvall and Baker (2012) stated that no source has been identified for this expression. However, Huttar, Essegbey, and Ameka (2007) showed that a *strong/hard ears* expression exists in Twi and possibly Ga, and the authors inferred that Ndyuka inherited that expression from later substrate/adstrate influence during the postformative years of that plantation creole (p. 62).

### 3.3.6 Hard ears.

In Trinidad, Jamaica, and Guyana, speakers use the modifier *hard* with the noun *ears* to convey ‘stubbornness or disobedience’. In Cassidy and Le Page’s Jamaican dictionary (1967), there are instances in which the expression is used as a modifier, for example, *hard-aze people nubba prasper*, and also uses in which the collocation appears as a noun, as in *yu tink yu gwain kóm hía spáil di ada pikniz wid yu háad-iaz* ‘Do you think that you can come here and spoil the other children with your disobedient ways?’ (p. 220).
Table 3.6

*Hard Ears (Stubborn or Disobedient* in Trinidad, Jamaican, Guyanese Creole)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collocation</th>
<th>Mental activity</th>
<th>Concepts</th>
<th>Parts of speech</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>ears</em></td>
<td>metonymy</td>
<td>Body part → HEARING → ATTENTION → ATTRIBUTE</td>
<td>ear -hear -not listen -stubborn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>hard</em></td>
<td>metaphor</td>
<td>DURABILITY → STRENGTH</td>
<td>resilient -unyielding -impervious</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4 A Final Note on Pattern Replication and Conceptual Construal

Descriptive statements of metaphorical and metonymic language use in creoles and the identification of their models in a set of source languages that were relevant to their formation should be accompanied by rational explanations (but not replaced by them! as proposed by Chomsky, 2002 [1957]).

The common practice of tracing and identifying calques from West African languages in pidgins and creoles does not provide a complete picture concerning motivation for conceptual construal in the lexicon of a contact language. It is true that certain items were copied from structures in languages that were known to have been present during contact language formation, but their continued polysemous uses in constructions today are due to universals in language use, namely in metaphor and metonymy in conceptual construal.

Collocations attract pattern replication because they do not literally mean what the combination of words render. Instead, the combination has a metonymic and sometimes even a metaphorical function. Collocations are thus hard to translate and their metonymical or metaphorical effect are often unique and difficult to copy through existing word forms without resorting to creative pattern replication. (Matras, 2009, p. 247)
A deconstruction of seemingly idiomatic language use, for example, *eyes* and *ears* to convey abstract notions of *greed* and *stubbornness*, provides glimpses into the regular and unsurprising nature of the mind’s creative capacities when it comes to languaging, whether it emerges in pidgins and creoles, their West African substrates and adstrates, or in regional varieties of European languages today.

Recent research on Mande (Nikitina, 2008) and Benue-Kwa languages (Ameka, 2002; Ansah 2013, 2014a, 2014b) suggest that, in general, West African and AEC languages use linguistic constructions that display abstract conceptualizations such as *jealousy*, *anger*, *hunger*, *confusion*, and *sorrow* as anthropomorphic human forces that have agentive attributes. Examples of agency are shown here in creole languages spoken in Suriname: *hangi ta kisi mi* ‘I am hungry’, lit. *hungry is catching me* (Alleyne, 1980, p. 119, bold added). In place of the italicized words, Saramaccan and Ndjuka use *kisi*, ‘to catch’.

...he received *kisi* understanding of... = lit. ‘He caught understanding.’

...he thought of *kisi* what to do to thwart his enemies.’

The magical charm *has had its effect on* *kisi* him already.’

...spread the boat sides apart until they're spread apart as far as *kisi* you like them.’

...shame will *kisi* you = lit. ‘Shame will catch you.’

A cold *kisi* him = lit. ‘A cold caught him.’

Confusion *kisi* him = lit. ‘Confusion caught him.’

Sorrow *kisi* him = lit. ‘Sorrow caught him.’

The couple *kisi* 3 children = lit. ‘The couple caught three children.’

The racers ran *kisi* for *kisi* = lit. ‘The racers ran catch for catch.’

Figure 3.2. *Kisi* in Surinamese Creoles (adapted from Alleyne, 1980, pp. 117-118).
Pattern replication and scripting of the body to convey spatial conceptualizations are two multifunctional morphosyntactic/semantic features that have been discussed above that are typical of AECs and West African languages, such as Ewe and Akan. Although speakers of English can employ similar constructions, the process occurs more frequently in African languages (Heine & Leyew, 2008, p. 26) and Atlantic creoles.

In the non-maroon variety of Jamaican Creole, there are 250 words of African origin (Holm, 1988, p. 81, referring to Cassidy, 1964). Indeed, this reflects a large base of borrowed Africanisms. However, the form of the words that are found in creole languages can be attributed to their respective lexifier languages. Holm raises the question that Cassidy (1964) posed concerning the source of divergent morphosyntactic and semantic patterns in creole languages of the Atlantic, namely whether the differences between Standard English and English-lexifier creoles of Jamaica, Suriname, and Cameroon can be attributed to West African substrate influence, or if they are relics of archaic English and/or regional varieties of English from England and Ireland that were diffused to West Africa and then to the Caribbean in the 17th century by sailors and dispossessed Europeans (Hancock, 1986; Linebaugh & Rediker, 2000). Similar metonymic scriptings of the body are used in AECs, but can be found in older forms of English, which probably served as the lexifier language for many of the Atlantic creoles (Hancock, 1986; Bailey & Ross, 1988). Yet, the Oxford English Dictionary attributes an Afro-Caribbean origin to verbal uses of these expressions, such as sweet mouth ‘to flatter’ (n.d.):

1948 Publ. Amer. Dial. Soc. IX. 81 Employment [by the Gullahs] of groups of words for..verbs..or other parts of speech (such as..to *sweet mouth ‘to flatter’). 1950 Language XXVI. 330 Not recorded in the Atlas but commonly
considered to be of Negro origin are such metaphors as sweet-mouth ‘to flatter’ and bad-mouth ‘to curse’.

Note the mid-19th century reference to Gullah. The *Oxford English Dictionary* provides the definition for the modifier *sweet-mouthed*, which has two meanings (n.d.): (1) fond of sweet-flavored things, dainty; and (2) speaking sweetly (usually ironically). The entry is marked as an archaism:

1542 Udall Erasm. Apoph. 45 For that he was so *sweete mouthed, and drouned in the voluptuousnesse of high fare; 1623 Middleton & Rowley Sp. Gipsy II. (1653) D1, This cherry-lip'd, sweet-mouth'd villaine. 1886 J.F. Maurice in Lett. fr. Donegal Pref. p. vi, The class which Mr. Parnell never speaks of except as the ‘felon’ landlords, just as his sweet-mouthed friends speak of The Times.

Another term that can be found in AECs and Benue-Kwa languages is *heartburn*, which is used as a noun to mean ‘jealousy’. In older forms of English recorded in the *Oxford English Dictionary* (n.d.), it meant ‘rankling jealousy’, ‘discontent’, or ‘enmity’:

1621 G. Sandys vid's Met. II. (1626) 42 Faire Herse's happy state such heart-burne breeds In her black bosom. 1748 Richardson Larissa (1811) II. 78 Not without a little of the heart-burn. 1862 H. AÏDÉ Carr of Carrlyon II. 253 Was so poor a triumph worth the exchange to an existence of struggle, and heartburn, and unrest?

*Heartburn* as a verb meaning ‘to affect with heartburning; to render jealous or grudging’ is an archaic use of the term, and resembles Early Modern English more than Standard English (n.d.):
It is important to note these similarities in processes of conceptual construal of *flattery* and *anger* in older forms of English, West African languages, and AECs. Copying of these structures should be understood in terms of cultural continuity—from both lexifier and substrate sources—and creative pattern replication. The examples from English, however, are characterized as archaic in the literature and employed in unusual dialects that are unlike Metropolitan Englishes. A further avenue to consider about the lexifier, then, could be taken with the following guiding question: When did English speakers shift conceptualizations of these concepts from the body to a lexical item that had only an abstract reference? Generally speaking, the shift of metaphorical conceptualization in English seems to have occurred in the 16th and 17th centuries, when philosophers and scientists in the Western tradition began to conceptualize reason as something separate from the body. Reason was extracted from within us and placed outside of our reach. The rise of 17th century rationalist/mechanistic thinking led to new metaphorical conceptualizations that were used in dominant discourses. English became abstracted, metaphysical, stripped of agency, and controlled by a Divine Force. This change in thought has shaped the way in which science has been conducted, religion has been practiced, and law has been enforced for four hundred years.
This chapter has discussed conceptual construal of the human body that emerges in abstract expressions. Similar to the case study on \textit{MV for} in Chapter 3, I argued that semantics motivates morphosyntactic phenomena. The next chapter continues the application of cognitive semantics to creole studies by looking to metaphorical conceptualizations that motivated colonial projects and activities in the Caribbean.
Chapter 4

Conceptual Metaphor Theory, Racialized Discourses, and Afro-Caribbean Histories

The seventeenth and eighteenth century Caribbean became one of the key sites for the primitive accumulation of capital for the perfection of the means of production and labor extraction, for the establishment of global trade networks and for the creation of the discourses of domination without any of which the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century would have been possible. (Haiman, 2006, p. 85)

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I attempt to use cognitive semantics to shed light on the existence of metaphors that have motivated hegemonic discourses of imperialism, colonialism, and plunder in the Caribbean. I argue that discursive strategies of erasure were implemented in the Caribbean as a result of insurrectional responses to colonialism on the part of Indigenous peoples, Afro-Caribbean peoples, and poor European indentured servants. In line with Haiman (2006, p. 83), I contend:

- slavery and the concept of racial inferiority became cognitively blended and the blend strengthened (i.e. became neurally entrenched) as the availability of indigenous American labor decreased, and the use of white indenture proved unreliable, running off in great numbers to join native Americans and escaped African slaves in maroon communities.

The maroonage and revolts that occurred in the 17th and 18th centuries are examples of actions that were motivated by a distinct way of thinking, namely a conceptual
system of resistance, which was in conflict with the Western program of capital accumulation.

4.1.1 Conceptual metaphor theory.

Conceptual metaphor theory, as advanced by Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999), draws on the role of human imaginative capacities in reasoning and rational actions. These processes allow humans to make meaningful sense of experiences that they encounter in their lives. Besides Wilson Harris’ work on philosophies of the Caribbean (see Engman, 2008, for an overview of key themes in Harris’ works), the importance of the imaginative capacities of the mind in the organization of thought and the creation of language has been largely neglected in contemporary studies of creole languages and cultures by linguists and other social scientists. The following sections discuss the framework of conceptual metaphor theory in general and the metaphor LAND AND PEOPLES AS COMMODIFIABLE RESOURCES in particular to reference the way in which European metropoles established, propagated, and justified their hegemony in the Caribbean.

Western hegemony is defined in this paper as the spread of ideologies that represent Western notions of rational action in science, philosophy, and politics. To focus on processes of hegemonic language and culture with regard to Caribbean settings, it is appropriate to begin with the early modern period (1500-1750), as scientific and economic insights of this period led to the Expansion Era, when European powers endeavored to explore and ultimately to conquer the ‘New World.’ European metropolitan powers justified their actions in accordance with European concepts of enlightened, rational thinking that emerged around the time of the establishment of the Royal Society of London in the middle of the 17th century.
4.1.2 Investigating the nature of scientific inquiry in the 17th century.

Most of modern science has placed its faith in the scientific method and has based its justification for usurpations and erasures of power and identity on “unified knowledge with material power” (Mies, 1986 p. 88). Violence and competition have been the key methods by which Western science has established domination over nature, women, and colonized peoples. The dominant discourses of Western hegemony have conditioned us to think that competition and violence are the naturally functioning ways of the world, with little or no space allowed for co-operation and complementary co-existence. Selection is seen as a zero-sum game, the winner takes all. Dominant cultures and languages spread, erasing cultures and languages in their paths.

From the time of its inception in 1660, the Royal Society in London searched for new scientific methods that would shed light on the true nature of the world. These new methods that early-modern thinkers such as Copernicus, Galileo, Bacon, Descartes, Huygens, Boyle, Newton, Wilkins, Locke and others developed would eventually lead to the Age of Enlightenment, an age of “developing objective science, achieving a universal form of morality and law, and liberating rational modes of thought and social organization from the perceived irrationalities of myth, religion, and political tyranny” (Steger, 2003, p. 28). It is no coincidence that this particular time period coincides with the transition to a new capitalist model of colonial domination by Europe, first over the Americas and eventually over Africa and the rest of the world.

In the 16th and 17th centuries, philosophers and scientists began to conceptualize reason as something separate from the body. In a sense, reason was extracted from within us and placed outside of our reach. In this period, language, the
facilitator of reason, gained a special status. It became a means of control, specifically for controlling those who had not adopted the enlightened, Western hegemonic tradition. Even in the present post-modern era, Francis Bacon’s scientific method is still the method that most scientists believe to have an objective advantage for conducting scientific investigation. In this paper, I assert that scientific investigation in and of itself is a relativistic processes that focuses more on finding than on finding out. The very sense of what objectivity is originates from the hegemonic ideas that people accept concerning what is and is not pertinent to and appropriate for scientific inquiry. The current consensus of what is objective can be considered to be a key component of the dominant discourses of science, to which academics adhere in the same dogmatic and faith-based manner as alchemists adhered to previous dominant discourses. As we are constrained to certain modes of interpretation when conducting scientific research, there can be no value-neutral science (Whorf, 1956). Science is dominated by dogmatic and empirically unverifiable beliefs that have plagued scientific discourse and scientific communities for hundreds of years. These dominant discourses have severely limited and restricted the results of centuries of research to that which could be utilized in the Western hegemonic project of world domination by a small ruling class. Western economic activity has inculcated these dominant discourses into our reasoning (Fairclough, 2003, p. 208):

Inculcation is a matter of people coming to ‘own’ discourses, to position themselves inside them, to act and think and talk and see themselves in terms of new discourses. A stage towards inculcation is rhetorical deployment: people may learn new discourses and use them for certain purposes (e.g. procuring funding for regional development projects or academic research) while at the same time self-consciously keeping a distance from them. One of
the complexities of the dialectics of discourse is the process in which what begins as self-conscious rhetorical deployment becomes ‘ownership’–how people become un-self-consciously positioned ‘within’ a discourse.

4.2 Metaphors that Dominate Western Hegemonic Reasoning

4.2.1 Primary metaphors.

Up-down constitutes one of the most basic of human experiences (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). It is not surprising that much of the language which we use to conceptualize events and causes are directly related back to our understanding of this embodied experience. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) essentially argue that these metaphors situate people in relation to their beliefs about themselves and their surroundings: “People view themselves as being in control over animals, plants, and their physical environment, and it is their unique ability to reason that places human beings above other animals and gives them this control. CONTROL IS UP thus provides a basis for MAN IS UP and therefore RATIONAL IS UP” (p. 17). Those who accept Western hegemonic discourse perceive their relation to nature and to indigenous peoples by using a basic orientation metaphor UP IS SUPERIOR/GOOD, DOWN IS INFERIOR/BAD which leads to conceptual metaphors such as:

1) RATIONAL IS UP/SUPERIOR/GOOD

2) MAN IS RATIONAL/SUPERIOR/GOOD,
   EUROPEAN IS RATIONAL/SUPERIOR/GOOD,
   CULTURE IS RATIONAL/SUPERIOR/GOOD

3) WOMAN IS IRRATIONAL/INFERIOR/EVIL,
   NON-EUROPEAN IS IRRATIONAL/INFERIOR/EVIL,
   NATURE IS IRRATIONAL/INFERIOR/EVIL
4.2.2. Conceptual metaphors.

Racism is based to some extent on a conflation of the metaphors listed above with others such as WHITE IS PURE/CLEAN/INNOCENT/GOOD and, therefore, UP/SUPERIOR, BLACK IS IMPURE/DIRTY/CORRUPT/EVIL and, therefore, DOWN/INFERIOR.

LABOR IS A RESOURCE and TIME IS A RESOURCE are two important conceptual metaphors that motivated the transition to capitalism in the Caribbean. This transition relied crucially on widespread acceptance of these hegemonic constructs as truths. The language engineers of the 17th century (Slaughter, 1982) were in a position to embed dominant metaphors into the unitary standardized language that they attempted to re-create out of the heteroglossic chaos of complex human interactional behaviors mediated by speech. The hegemonic discourses that they were perpetuating were in line with notions of economic and political development to be achieved through the colonization and commodification of land and peoples. Western hegemonic metaphors that motivate systems of domination are still very much alive and, like the 16th and 17th centuries, they have a special role in political and social decision-making via the Rational Actor Model (Lakoff, 2008).

Lakoff and Johnson stress that our perception of events changes as the result of the dominant position that certain metaphors have in the history of our society, for example, the perception of labor and leisure activities has been configured by the LABOR IS A RESOURCE metaphor (1980, p. 67):

In viewing labor as a kind of activity, the metaphor assumes that labor can be clearly identified and distinguished from things that are not labor. It makes the assumptions that we can tell work from play and productive activity from nonproductive activity.... The view of labor as merely a kind of activity,
independent of who performs it, how he experiences it, and what it means in
his life, hides the issues of whether the work is personally meaningful,
satisfying, and humane. What is hidden by the RESOURCE metaphors for
labour and time is the way our concepts of LABOR and TIME affect our
concept of LEISURE, turning it into something remarkably like LABOR. The
RESOURCE metaphors for labor and time hide all sorts of possible
conceptions of labor and time that exist in other cultures and in some sub-
cultures of our own society: the idea that work can be play, that inactivity can
be productive, that much of what we classify as LABOR serves either no clear
purpose or no worthwhile purpose.

The same metaphorical conceptualizations that Lakoff and Johnson explained above
have crept into the dominant discourses of the Caribbean, as well. The most salient
metaphors that exist with regard to colonization, Western economic and cultural
hegemony, and the erasure of peoples’ identities in the Caribbean include orientation
metaphors like CONTROL IS UP and MAN IS UP, as well as conceptual metaphors
like LABOR IS A RESOURCE, PEOPLES ARE RESOURCES, and PEOPLE ARE
PLANTS.

The metaphorical conceptualizations of the events that I reference in the
sections below are meant to be placed within the background of the early modern
period and are emphasized to show correlations between the unfolding of those events
and the emergence of Western hegemonic thought, especially in relation to the
philosophical, political, and social movements that constituted the Restoration and the
English Enlightenment. The central difference between Western and non-Western
ontologies and epistemologies can be specified in terms of two distinct
conceptualizations: metaphors of co-operation and sustainability in the non-Western
tradition, and violent metaphors of land and peoples as commodifiable resources in the Western hegemonic tradition. My future research will deal with West African and Indigenous Caribbean philosophies that are based on self-sustaining metaphors, which, in turn, motivate other metaphors of co-operation, sustainability and subsistence.

Western hegemonic science, on the other hand, has imported competition-based exogenous philosophies into the Caribbean, which are motivated by violent metaphors such as LAND IS A COMMODIFIABLE RESOURCE and PEOPLE ARE COMMODIFIABLE RESOURCES. The following sections describe the ways in which such Western hegemonic metaphors of competition and domination have served as the prototype for causal reasoning since the 16th and 17th centuries. These metaphors have motivated policies of enclosure, pillage, and erasure in the Caribbean from the early modern period to the present time.

4.2.3 Western hegemonic science: Early examples of hegemonic scientific inquiry.

The creation of a unitary, standardized, taxonomized conceptualization of language became a major project of the 17th century, exemplified by the attempt to create a universal language (Slaughter, 1982, pp. 1-3). The Baconian method introduced in 1630, and developed by Wilkins in 1668, eventually led to the creation of the universal language project. The dominant trend in science established in the 16th century was the assignment of values to words through taxonomical nomenclatures. Scientists felt they could gain control over nature if they designated and defined it in terms of pure essences, conceived of in the Aristotelian sense. Of course domination over nature could only be attained through language, which,
ironically, had to be reordered and taxonomized itself in order to produce an essential and appropriate language sufficient enough to codify and, at the same time, decode the natural world.

The 17th century language engineers endeavored to construct a language that would accurately represent the nature of the world. The method used by these language engineers was typical of scientific procedure in the 16th and 17th centuries. Slaughter explains:

The analysis of nature into its simple elements or component parts was understood to be the prerequisite of a philosophical language. Constructing it [the language] required no less than providing a model or theory of nature….the model and explanation of nature adopted by the language projectors were taxonomic. (1982, p. 3).

The scientists and language engineers of the 17th century felt that if they could satisfactorily “methodize, follow a strict set of rules, consciously proceed by an institutionalized (impersonal) set of directions,” then it would lead to “triumphing over, or at least controlling, chaos [the nature of the world]” (Slaughter, 1982, p. 7). The thinking was mechanistic in that scientists firmly believed that parts of a whole had to be decontextualized in order for a satisfactory and truthful analysis to be carried out. In a similar vein, taxonomy and nomenclature in the sciences were closely related to another popular method of science in the 17th century, namely alchemy:

To the natural historian of the seventeenth century, plant organisms are regarded as structures, i.e. arrangements or configurations of a number of significant elements or variables; the structure is the visible sign of the essence. The isolation of these variables or the decomposition of the organism into these elements permits organic form to be reconstituted or retranslated
into a linear language, into a series of successively ordered elements which constitute a taxonomy. Once this is done, they can be represented in natural language and given names. (Slaughter, 1982, pp. 9-10)

4.3 Rational Actors and Processes of Colonization in the Caribbean

Although she does not explicitly mention metaphor as a theory, Maria Mies critiques the scientific method by metaphorically constructing Western hegemonic science into systems of exploitation that have remained central to patriarchal systems of domination. The author states, “The progress of European Big Men is based on the subordination and exploitation of their own women, on the exploitation and killing of Nature, on the exploitation and subordination of other peoples and their lands” (1986, p. 76). I agree with Mies and contend that the ideology which drove much of the political activity of the early modern period can be conceptualized using metaphors that evoke ideas of commodification, such as PEOPLE ARE COMMODIFIABLE RESOURCES and LAND IS A COMMODIFIABLE RESOURCE. Those metaphors motivated actions that attempted to erase the commons and to expropriate and enclose lands in the Caribbean.

The ideology that such metaphorical conceptualization spread was largely influential in England during the 16th and 17th centuries; it had to be, for England’s conceptualization of progress was in line with those kinds of activities (Linebaugh and Rediker, 2000, pp. 8-35). Beckles (1998) notes that:

[T]wo main themes can be identified in these [ideological works by promoters of Empire in the 17th century]: the need to develop a labour market in the colonies which would rid England (and also Ireland and Scotland) of potential trouble-makers; and the need to ensure colonial dependence upon the mother country. (p. 223)
Although this erasure ideology was emerging in England since the 13th century with the first enclosures of the commons, the public was able to resist those enclosures and, ultimately, implement their own discourses, as the Magna Carta affirms (Linebaugh, 2008). However, in the 17th century, the hegemonic apparatus of which the Royal Society was an important part was successful in achieving erasure of the commons’ power by implementing hegemonic discourses of domination that were conceptualized via the metaphor NATURE IS A COMMODIFIABLE RESOURCE.

Both Merchant and Mies state this intention explicitly in their works:

The mechanistic model reinforced and accelerated the exploitation of nature and human beings as resources. (Merchant, 1983, p. 43)

Nature had to be transformed into a vast reservoir of material resources to be exploited and turned into profit by this [the rising protestant, capitalist] class. (Mies, 1986, p. 88)

These discourses led to the belief that land was a commodifiable resource, something to be used up. The perception of people and land as commodifiable resources eventually developed into erasure strategies of languages, cultures, identities, and belief systems.

Today, we see that metaphors of erasure have had consequential effects in social, political, and scientific arenas. First, the 17th century conceptualization of progress erased the egalitarian co-operative social space that the commons had fostered and which had been used as a means of subsistence and abundance for all and replaced it with: “[T]he predatory patriarchal mode of production [that] constitutes a non-reciprocal, exploitative relationship. Within such a relationship, no general progress for all, no ‘trickling down’, no development for all is possible” (Mies, 1986, p. 76). Second, hegemonic metaphors motivated and justified political acts of
systemic exploitation during the Restoration, the colonization of the Caribbean, and the formation of the scientific disciplines in the Age of Enlightenment: “Colonies cannot achieve wealth unless they also have colonies. If the emancipation of men is based on the subordination of women, then women cannot achieve ‘equal rights’ with men, which would necessarily include the right to exploit others” (Mies, 1986, p. 76).

Little has changed in the 21st century in terms of subsequent acts of exploitation that have been carried out in the name of globalization and modernization (Klein, 2008).

Third, the 17th-century scientific method de-emphasized connections between parts and, instead, focused on individual units; science became analytic, as opposed to holistic. Whereas 17th-century alchemical, patriarchal science endeavored to “cut apart and separate parts which constitute a whole, isolate these parts, analyze them under the laboratory conditions and synthesize them again in a new, man-made, artificial model,” 21st century feminist theories have aimed to abolish all “relationships of retrogressive progression” (Mies, 1986, p. 77). Mies states that, “European science and technology, and its mastery over nature have to be linked to the persecution of the European witches. And both the persecution of the witches and the rise of modern science have to be linked to the slave trade and the destruction of subsistence economies in the colonies” (1986, p. 77). She specifically refers to Francis Bacon to demonstrate how those in power in the philosophical and scientific arenas set the standard for patriarchal thinking in the 16th and 17th centuries (1986, p. 87):

Francis Bacon, the ‘father’ of modern science, the founder of the inductive method, used the same methods, the same ideology to examine nature which the witch-persecutioners used to extract the secrets from the witches, namely, torture, destruction, violence. He deliberately used the imagery of the witch-
hunt to describe his new scientific method: he treated ‘nature as a female to be tortured through mechanical inventions’ [Merchant, 1983, p. 168].

The dominant discourses of Western hegemony are constructed on metaphors and syllogisms such as: NATURE IS A RESOURCE, LAND IS A RESOURCE, LABOR IS A RESOURCE, RESOURCES ARE COMMODITIES, NATURE/WOMEN/NON-EUROPEANS/BLACKS ARE IRRATIONAL and, therefore, NATURE/WOMEN/NON-EUROPEANS/BLACKS ARE COMMODITIES. This was the metaphorical thinking that 17th century philosophers used when they reasoned about the world and personified it as something to be commodified (Federici, 2004; Von Werlhof, 2001). Resources are commodifiable, hence the idea that persons thought to be less rational than the “standard average European” (Whorf, 1956)—Africans, Indigenous persons, and women—could be used by any means necessary to yield profits in the colonial system. Even in the 20th and 21st centuries, ever increasing commodification has undeniably been the primary aim of the neoliberal and globalization projects. Whereas land, labor, colonized peoples, and women have been seen in Western hegemonic discourse as resources for unlimited exploitation since the 17th century, the scope and depth of commodification and colonization has recently been extended from land, labour, colonized peoples, and women to human body parts, cells, DNA sequences, hedge funds, mortgage futures, intellectual property, and a host of other new frontiers for the profiteers and their global casino that Western hegemonic discourse supports and defends.

4.3.1 Scientific inquiry today.

After the dispossession of peoples starting in the early modern period and lasting into the 19th century, we see a shift in the 20th century in terms of how
dominant discourses are focused. Nevertheless, patterns of erasure still constitute the prototype for causal reasoning. In the modern period, the focus turned to the consumption of novel sources of power, such as electricity and petroleum. Like the alchemists discussed above, Steger (2003) argues that the elite of the modern period seek unregulated use of energy sources, which results in the annihilation of animal and plant ecologies and the “toxification of entire regions” (p. 33). Those who controlled the dominant discourses also constructed ways of “inventing novel forms of bureaucratic control and developing new surveillance techniques designed to accumulate more information about nationals while keeping ‘undesirables’ out” (Steger, 2003, p. 33). European colonial powers of the early modern period and neoliberals today have aimed to erase modes of production that are based on traditional indigenous lifeways which are thought to be in competition with the capitalist/colonial system. From the first stages of the Age of Enlightenment onward:

> Europeans and their descendants on other continents took it upon themselves to assume the role of the world’s guardians of universal law and morality....

> [These] economic entrepreneurs and their academic counterparts began to spread a philosophy of individualism and rational self interest that glorified the virtues of an idealized capitalist system supposedly based upon the providential workings of the free market and its ‘invisible hand’. (Steger, 2003, p. 31)

Today, promoters of capitalist ideology in the United States’ have implemented campaigns of shock and erasure throughout the world as part of the successful spread of corporate globalization. There are five claims about globalization which the public has accepted because of the dominant position that the Western hegemonic discourse holds in the public sphere: 1) Globalization is about the liberalization and global
integration of markets; 2) Globalization is inevitable and irreversible; 3) Nobody is in charge of globalization; 4) Globalization benefits everyone; 5) Globalization furthers the spread of democracy in the world (Steger, 2003, pp. 97-110). This consensus notwithstanding, some scholars have been able to expose the disastrous role that the U.S. government has played in the spread of globalism through its implementation of economic “shock therapy” (Klein, 2007). Investigative journalist Naomi Klein states: “[W]hile the shock therapists were trying to remove all relics of collectivism from the economy, the shock troops were removing the representatives of that ethos from the streets, the universities and the factory floors” (2007, p. 136). Erasure campaigns have been largely carried out by Western powers, whose ideologies, as discussed above, are motivated by metaphors of enclosure and domination. Commodification of resources for the purpose of capital accumulation constitutes the basis for globalism as an ideology. This hegemonic ideology is not much different today than it was in the 17th century.

4.4 Conclusion

Lakoff and Johnson (1999) remind readers that most classical philosophy insists that the mind is disembodied, an entity in itself and autonomous from other cognitive properties. Today, we know that metaphor plays a large role in the development of scientific theories, and that theories determine what is relevant to scientific enquiry.

There is no such thing as neutral science or objectivity in the commonly used senses of these words and the metaphors that we use as scientists limit the scope of what we investigate and limit what we permit ourselves to obtain as results. In their article on the study of theories of attention in cognitive psychology, Fernandez-Duque and Johnson (2002) state, “There are no theory-independent, metaphor-independent
phenomena....scientists use their knowledge of the source domain entities and operations to develop a parallel knowledge structure for the target domain” (p. 162). If we start with a competition metaphor, we only investigate competition and we only discover competition. González López et al. (2012) have demonstrated how these metaphors have been employed in creolistics. It is necessary to bring such findings about the human mind and its capacity to reason to light so that people can form their own non-hegemonic ideas, first, about how their brains work, and, secondly, about what motivates their thoughts and actions. As Lakoff (1987) states, “We all have alternative methods of conceptualization at our disposal, whether we are trying to understand our emotions or trying to comprehend the nature of the physical universe” (p. 306). Furthermore, not all perception is equal. There can be significant differences between conceptualizations of an event depending on one’s physical surrounding and cultural conditioning. Identity and ideology are motivated by speakers’ ideas about truth conditions in the world, and those are formed by dominant discourses that are circulated in the cultures in which they live.

A final remark on metaphor, poetry, and dominant discourses

Authors who engage readers with alternative realities can lead readers out of 21st century colonization. According to Bernabé, Chamoisseau, and Confiant (1990), Caribbean literature draws together and liberates the Caribbean person (pp. 896-897):

Only poetic knowledge, fictional knowledge, literary knowledge, in short, artistic knowledge can discover us, understand us and bring us, evanescent, back to the resuscitation of consciousness…. acceptance of our Creoleness will allow us to invest these impenetrable areas of silence where screams are lost. Only then will our literature restore us to duration, to the continuum of time and space; only then will it be moved by its past and become historical.
St. Martin poet Lasana Sekou urges his readers to take action. Action makes us dance, for dancing is a means to create space for oneself. Sekou says that St. Martiners must make spaces for themselves, to situate themselves or they will be situated: “what is to be done/ by you or to you but done it will be in the doing” (2005, pp. 40-41). González López et al. (2012) argue along similar lines in the field of creole linguistics:

It is our view that if we do not explicitly position ourselves politically, we will automatically be positioned by and in support of the dominant discourses of patriarchy, capitalism, and racism. Because these discourses have systematically denied agency to women and peoples of African, Indigenous, and marginalized European descent in the forging of colonial era histories, cultures, and languages, we have dedicated our work as creolists to investigating, acknowledging, publicizing, and celebrating the resourcefulness and creative ways in which these same people have resisted domination politically, economically, culturally, and linguistically. (p. 223)

Sekou’s poetry also focuses on agency in the greater Caribbean context. Literacy is of central concern to themes like agency and the construction of languages and literatures. Bakhtin (2000 [1934-35]), Barthes (2000 [1957]), and Freire (1970) have framed agency in terms of the metaphor READING IS LIVING. Farcaclas (2009) distinguishes between three levels of critical reading:

1) Superficial level, which is identification with the dominant discourse; this is, reading the lines that have been written for you, analyzing neither the intentions nor the power relations behind the discourse.

2) Freire’s “Reading the World,” which is critically reading the discourses that we are exposed to in order to determine the intentions of the people or the
class who formulated those discourses.

3) Freire’s “Writing the World,” which is the deepest level of reading wherein we expel others’ intentions from the discourses that we live by and repopulate or re-saturate them with our own intentions.

Sekou reminds Caribbean readers that they are not objects of history, but subjects of history. St. Martiners must critically read the past to know how to write their place today. The Salt Reaper urges all Caribbean persons to remember their histories as salt reapers, hewers of water, gatherers of wood, cane walkers, and maroons (Sekou, 2005, pp. 56-57). It is imperative that St. Martiners not just read the world, but write the world by engaging in it: “To understand this thing about rightful claim is to engage/ the contest/ POWER” (Sekou, 2005, p. 3). Sekou urges his readers to recognize the lack of agency in St. Martin and the Caribbean. He confronts them with the following question: “In our s’maatin/ Is there one date of union/ Of ourown accord/ Or the less with permission/ & the rest of time&place in name for rulers/ queen’s birthday/ bastille day/ riley’s hill/ ?” (2005, p. 58). St. Martiners must name something of their own and create something of their own, hence Sekou’s insistence on the creation of the national book for and by St. Martiners.
Chapter 5

Cultivating Ambiguity: Additional Insight on Complexity in Creoles

Is a variety judged to be simple by some independent measure or only by comparison to another variety? (Siegel, 2008, p. 20)

5.1 Introduction

Pidgins have impoverished morphological systems and simple syntactic properties. The previous statement is meant to have a neutral reading; however, it cannot be interpreted as neutral. The word *impoverished* implies a resultative (change of state) meaning: the language was rich in morphology, but its current morphological state suggests a reduction of strength and vitality of structure. Impoverished and simple are words that carry “contextual overtones” and are understood relative to some previous states (Bakhtin, 2000, p. 278). When a pidgin is framed in this way, readers can take one of the following positions: (i) pidgin is characterized relative to itself; this means that the language predates the contact scenario from which it emerged, and in its previous state it had richer coding properties than we find after the contact scenario, or (ii) pidgin is characterized relative to some other set(s) of languages. Position (i) does not work, since a pidgin does not exist until language contact occurs. The use of impoverished, then, can only be understood relative to languages in contact. Although there is no mention of input languages in the description of pidgins that appears in the first line of this chapter, the reader is still forced to understand pidgin relative to some other language(s). The debate has already
been framed for us when we accept characterizations like *impoverished, reduced, and simple* in descriptions of pidgins and creoles.

5.1.1 Discourse on complexity and simplicity in pidgin and creole grammar.

In current debates on complexity and simplicity in creole grammar it is common to talk about pidgins and creoles having extremely reduced inventories of morphological forms that were inherited from European input languages. Those forms were selected from a linguistic feature pool during contact language formation (Mufwene, 2001). Speakers of morphologically rich languages were likely to produce pidgins that had some morphology, whereas speakers of a language like English, which has few inflectional items, were not likely to supply many morphological forms to an English-based pidgin. Roberts and Bresnan (2008) have introduced a cline of reduction to characterize pidgin morphology. Extreme ends of the cline represent cases of either full retention or full loss. The reduction has generally resulted in a change toward an analytic type of contact language. Parkvall and Bakker (2013) provide a discussion of features that are typically absent in the majority of the known cases of pidgin languages (pp. 39–46): these include inflectional marking for case, gender, number, definiteness, tense-mood-aspect, valence, and politeness. Some pidgins are situated in the *partial retention of morphology* space of Roberts and Bresnan’s cline. For those pidgins, we can make generalizations about the kind of morphology that has been retained. Based on the findings in the pidgin data set available to date, Bakker (2003) established a hierarchy for retentions in nominal (n) and verbal (v) morphology in pidgins (p. 23): (n) a pidgin inflects nominal forms to indicate gender more often than case or number; it holds, then, that if a pidgin inflects for gender, it has also preserved inflection for case or number, or possibly both; (v) a
pidgin inflects verbs to indicate gender more often than person, number, valence, or tense-mood-aspect, respectively; if a pidgin inflects for gender, it has also preserved inflection for at least one of the other categories.

Despite Bakker’s (2003) and Roberts & Bresnan’s (2008) works, which have advanced our understanding of structural retention in contact languages, there are still debates that frame contact languages of the Afro-Atlantic as simplified versions of Indo-European languages (Chaudenson, 2001; McWhorter, 2005). Siegel (2008) rightfully points out pitfalls that confront creolists when they attempt to compare one linguistic system to another. Siegel identifies two dominant trends in creolistics that have attempted to account for simplicity and complexity in pidgin and creole grammars: quantitative studies and qualitative studies. Quantitative studies rely on the accumulation of features in a contact language, for example, the number of morphological forms, the number of marked categories, and the size of the lexicon. Qualitative studies have considered psycholinguistic aspects of language use to determine simplicity and complexity in a contact language. Two of these features include ease of processing and ease of acquisition, as measured by semantic transparency and iconicity. Note, however, that linguists have found “the absence of inflectional morphology and grammatical markers in general does not necessarily affect the expressive power of a language” (Siegel, 2008, p. 19; see also Labov, 1990). The simplicity issue in pidgin and creole studies is usually judged comparatively, and that comparison is made relative to a European lexifier language.

Regarding comparisons of Afro-Caribbean English-lexifier creoles (AECs) and their Indo-European lexifiers, there are two areas of inquiry that creolists pursue. First, most studies look to tense, mood, and aspect (TMA) systems to confirm the simplicity argument. The TMA system reflects the semantics of temporal, emotional,
and continuity categories. AECs like Crucian and Nigerian Pidgin use lexical items to mark functional categories, and creolists cite this strategy as less complex than the strategies employed in metropolitan Englishes, for example, which use morphological structures to represent grammatical features. Siegel (2008) summarizes the received wisdom: “lexicality corresponds with morphological simplicity while grammaticality corresponds with complexity” (p. 43). Second, in many cases, this axiom of lexical vs. functional is coupled with one of two approaches in the search for simplicity/complexity in pidgin and creole grammars: holistic versus modular analyses. Modular analyses look at specific domains that have been influenced by language contact (see Essegbey, 2005, and Corum, 2015, for example, for influences of substrates and adstrates on the domain of location marking). McWhorter (2011) compares languages based on their ages and whether they meet certain criteria, a kind of “creole litmus test” (pp. 1-18), and argues that older languages are more complex than younger languages like pidgins and creoles. McWhorter’s approach is a modular approach in part, focusing on comparative constructions, distal and proximal relations, and the copular system.

In Siegel (2008), we find a clear point of departure in the discussion of complexity and simplicity in pidgin and creole grammars. Siegel’s position begins with a statement about time and development, a view that frames the time component as crucial in the development of complexity. For some creolists, for example scholars who contributed chapters to Faraclas and Klein (2009), complexity and simplicity are measured by examining the number of phonological and morphosyntactic units and rules that currently exist in contact languages as compared to their input languages—what Mufwene (2013) refers to as “bit complexity” analysis (p. 162, citing Degraff, 2001, p. 268). Siegel believes that pidgin and creole speakers are involved in a
continual process of adding and deleting strategies that encode complex information in their languages as time progresses. McWhorter’s controversial work is predicated on similar grounds: creoles are young languages compared to their superstrates and substrates and, therefore, they show less complexity in syntax and semantics. Early states of child language do not demonstrate reduction of complexity either, but rather are reflections of early stages of linguistic development, or what Dahl (2004) calls the premature stages of “grammatical maturation” (pp. 119-156).

In summary, Siegel (2008) revealed four trends that appear in discussions of complexity and simplicity in pidgins and creoles compared to their input languages (p. 22):

1) Structural simplicity is framed on the basis of surface structural features.
2) Indicators are used that allow for an independent or absolute determination of simplicity as well as a comparative one.
3) Modular analyses are used over holistic comparisons.
4) Simplicity in pidgins and creoles reflects a lack of expansion rather than a reduction in complexity.

*Current aim.*

In the current chapter, I have suggested that simplicity is a contrived notion. It only makes sense in a comparative framework. In the remainder of this chapter, I hope to add support to the complexity side of the trends noted in Siegel (2008, p. 22) and listed above. I take a modular perspective by zooming in on a pragmatic component of creole grammar: non-salience and ambiguity in discourse.

Chaudenson and Mufwene believe that creole languages derive their structures from slaves’ failure to acquire the lexifier language. The creole, then, is the result of “approximations of approximations of the lexifier” (Chaudenson, 2001, p. 305). In the
superstrate view taken by Chaudenson and Mufwene, slave populations attempted to learn and to reuse language by listening to superstrate speakers; however, slaves were not good language learners (this despite their multilingual heritages!). Learners may have come close to acquiring the target language, but, more often than not, they never actually managed to do so. It is for this reason that we see approximations of approximations of the lexifier in creole languages today. Siegel (2008) takes note of this characterization of acquisition:

If, as a result of limited second language learning or the use of a pre-pidgin or restricted pidgin, a large number of speakers in the contact situation use lexical means rather than grammatical structures to express a particular concept, we would expect that this means of expression would end up in the creole. On the other hand, if a large number of speakers use grammatical means- either derived from the lexifier or developed in an expanded pidgin-then we would expect these to end up in the creole. (p. 53)

As Siegel stresses, it is important to validate the role that both substrate and superstrate languages played in the development of creole grammars. Siegel raises an important point about superstrate transfer and universal features. If a morphological structure appears in a creole language, it does not necessarily mean that it came directly from the lexifier: “A creole may acquire a great deal of derivational morphology from the lexifier, as in Haitian Creole (Degraff 2001[a]), but it is far more difficult to find evidence of inflectional morphology or other grammatical morphemes that come directly from the lexifier” (2008, p. 81). The aspect marker –ing, for example, seems to be derived from the English lexifier in Hawai‘ian Creole; however, not all the functions of the morpheme match those in the creole: “the use of –ing to indicate future action, as in I’m leaving tomorrow, is not found in Hawai‘ian
Creole” (Siegel, 2008, p. 80). What is particularly strong about Siegel’s argument on mixing and leveling is his explanation concerning processes of language emergence. His arguments rightfully ascribe agency to speakers in the development of their language varieties. Siegel says, “First, individuals come up with their own linguistic strategies for communicating with speakers of other languages that they do not know, and this mixture of features forms the ‘pool of variants’ (p. 136) [quoted from Siegel, 1997a] used for communication in the language contact situation” (2008, p. 40). The language can become more focused and, as a result, “leveling may occur, in which some features from the pool become no longer used for communication while others are retained” (Siegel, 2008, p. 40).

In the remainder of this chapter, I underscore the importance of recognizing discursive strategies as complex features in creoles. Discourse features like double-voicing and ambiguous zero-marking are also variants in the pool of features that Siegel discussed; these features did not undergo leveling, but they remain difficult to account for using current metrics of complexity versus simplicity. In the following section, I invoke insights from Bakhtin (2000) and his theory of dialogism in the hope that it can aid our analysis of plurilingualism and the cultivation of ambiguity in creole discourse.

5.2 Dialogism and Afro-Caribbean English-lexifier Creole

Mikhail Bakhtin was a Russian philosopher whose ideas about language and consciousness challenged the Cartesian rationalist and mechanistic view of language and mind. Bakhtin emphasized that language use is a shared dialogical process, as opposed to a monological set of operations performed in isolation. Utterances cannot be understood as single instances of a speech event; they are always understood in socio-cultural, historical, and genre- or register-specific contexts (Bakhtin, 2000).
Even more, the ways in which we assemble, use, reassemble, and reuse language is inextricably tied up with the ways in which others have assembled, used, reassembled, and reused language in their socio-cultural, historical, and genre- or register-specific contexts. This theory of language is called dialogism, and it almost seems like a quantum mechanical theory of communication, for example, in its description of meaning as an entangled state:

Dialogism argues that all meaning is relative in the sense that it comes about only as a result of the relation between two bodies occupying simultaneous but different space, where bodies may be thought of as ranging from the immediacy of our physical bodies, to political bodies and to bodies of ideas in general (ideologies). (Holquist, 2002, p. 19)

5.2.1 Nation language, not national language.

Brathwaite emphasizes the nature of creole hybridity in his configuration of “nation language” (1984), which is not a single unitary variety, but a diverse range of varieties. Brathwaite distinguishes the frame of monological unitary, hegemonic concepts of language that are typified by standardized written European languages from the frame of languages that stem from dialogical oral traditions from Africa and elsewhere (Faraclas, 2009). Nation language is not a national language that can be isolated and understood in relation to one people and one space. In a heteroglossic Afro-Caribbean contact setting, speakers have accesses to a range of varieties that include diverse Englishes, mixed codes and entwined languages, and traces of African and indigenous languages. Each of these is acknowledged in its own right and voiced when needed:
What I am going to talk about this morning is language from the [Afro-] Caribbean, the process of using English in a different way from the ‘norm’.

English in a new sense as I prefer to call it. English in an ancient sense. English in a very traditional sense. And sometimes not English at all, but language. (Brathwaite, 1984, p. 5)

The idea of nation language contradicts the notion of a unitary language, which displays centripetal tendencies imposed by dominant institutions and normative practices. Nation language is found in heteroglossic regions, where contradictory forces collide and give rise to many truths. In this sense, nation language finds connections with dialogism:

‘Both/and’ is not a mere wavering between two mutually exclusive possibilities, each of which is in itself logical and consistent, thus insuring the further possibility of truth, since a logic of this restrictive sort is so limiting that only one of the two options can be correct. Dialogic has its own logic, but not of this exclusive kind. (Holquist, 2002, p. 40)

Nation language does not waver between two mutually exclusive readings of one utterance, either. Nation language exists between speakers and listeners, and the meanings that can be conveyed by nation language are open to interpretation, at least two of which come from the perspectives of immediate speakers and listeners. But, one interpretation does not render invisible second, third, etc. interpretations; those meanings become relevant in a given register- or genre-specific context, time, and place by a given person who detects a familiar trace of her past, present, or future in a single utterance of language.
5.3 Cultivating Ambiguity: Complexity in Double Voicing Strategies

Multifunctional uses of lexical and grammatical items in AECs demonstrates complexities in discourse strategies that are best characterized as ingenious and creative responses to language in general and language contact in particular, according to Faraclas et al. (2014). Drawing on the notion of “double consciousness” from Du Bois (1903) and “heteroglossia” from Bakhtin (2000), Faraclas et al. (2014) conceptualize pluri-voicing in the Afro-Atlantic as a means of asserting affiliations with different linguistic identities and cultural heritages, specifically they provide strong support for convergence among West African substrates, European lexifiers, and proto Atlantic contact languages. AEC words and constructions can be used to engage multiple audiences:

Pluri-voicing has allowed Atlantic Creole speakers to equip themselves with a linguistic repertoire that has enabled them to use what appear at first glance to be the exact same words and structures to simultaneously assert Afro-Atlantic identities, Euro-Atlantic identities, Atlantic Creole identities and other identities to the extremely diverse and often very hostile and dangerous audiences and communities of practice in dialog with whom they have managed to survive (and even thrive) through slavery, colonialism, and neocolonialism. (Faraclas et al., 2014, p. 177-178)

Pluri-voicing as a complex discourse strategy is observed in uses of multifunctional lexical items that convey property concepts, for example, words that are considered adjectives in European languages and stative verbs in West African languages (Faraclas et al., 2014, p. 178). In Figure 5.1 below, a single utterance di sup swit from Nigerian Pidgin is interpreted differently under certain linguistic lenses: European
lenses (a), which favor static interpretations of properties, and West African lenses (b), which favor dynamic interpretations of properties.

a) ‘The soup is tasty to me.’ (adjectival reading of *swit* taking a preposition to introduce patient)

*b* ‘The soup appetizes me.’ (verbal reading of *swit* taking an object to introduce patient)

Di sup swit me.

Figure 5.1 Double-voicing and the property concept *swit* in Nigerian Pidgin (adapted from Faraclas et al., 2014, pp. 179-180).

There are compelling reasons to believe that motivation for the multiple meanings and functions of single items in creole discourse come from West African substrate and adstrate influences. Discourse strategies in West African languages value performance-oriented modes of communication and often employ multifunctional items that promote “cultivation of ambiguity” and indirectness (Faraclas et al., 2014, p. 181; see also Ameka & Breedveld, 2004; Tarr, 1979), which result in multiple interpretations of single utterances and other speech acts that intentionally draw listeners into dialogue.

Zero-marking is an additional feature that expresses double meanings and cultivates ambiguity in creole discourse. For instance, in AECs verbs can be left unmarked for tense and aspect, which leads to ambiguous meanings. This is not surprising, however, considering West African languages that influenced the grammars of AECs are “aspect prominent” (Faraclas, 1990, p. 105; Parkvall, 2000, p. 87), which means that they favor reporting on how an event unfolds rather than when an event occurs. The data in the CWC support the assertion that AECs are aspect
prominent, too. Table 5.1 displays the features that can be used to mark tense, mood, and aspect in AECs to disambiguate meaning.

Table 5.1
Creole Features and Disambiguation Strategies for Tense, Mood, and Aspect

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TMA Category</th>
<th>Derivation of Marker</th>
<th>English-lexifier Creoles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASPECT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[+completive]</td>
<td>From verb ‘done’ or ‘finish’</td>
<td><em>don, finish</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[-completive]</td>
<td>From verb ‘to be’</td>
<td>*de, da, a (from de ‘be’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODALITY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[-realis] (future)</td>
<td>From verb ‘to go’</td>
<td><em>go</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From verb ‘to be’</td>
<td><em>de</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TENSE/SEQUENCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[+past]</td>
<td>From past of ‘be’</td>
<td>*bin (from ‘been’) ain’t (from ‘be + not’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMARKED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[+active]</td>
<td>verb reads as</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[+completive], [+past]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[-active]</td>
<td>verb reads as</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-completive], [-past]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Adapted from Faraclas and the Working Group on the Agency of Marginalized Peoples in the Emergence of the Afro-Atlantic Creoles (2016).

Remarks on ambiguity and disambiguation markers in the CWC.

In AECs, irrealis mode is marked by *go* ‘go’. Faraclas (2004) provides the following example in Nigerian Pidgin: *A go waka* ‘I will walk’ (p. 347). The CWC data provides similar uses of *go* to mark the future, for example, *I gone call you again* ‘I will call you again’ (CWC, *gone*, hit 1). In the CWC, there are few instances in which *will* marks the future. The verbs *gone* and *gou* are often used to disambiguate modality: *We gou go for him right now* ‘We are going to go after him right now’ (CWC, *gou go*, hit 10).
Irrealis can also be marked using the incompletive aspect marker *dè* in AECs. Parkvall (2000) commented on the use of *dè* in seven AECs: “Several E[nglish C][reoles]s have been claimed to use the progressive marker /d)e ~ (d)a/ to encode future/irrealis, including Gullah EC, St Thomas EC, St Kitts EC, Sranan EC, Saramaccan EC, Guyana EC and Krio EC” (p. 84). Nigerian Pidgin uses *dè*, as in *À dè kóm* ‘I am coming,’ or ‘I will come (Faraclas, 2004, p. 344). In the CWC, the copula *de* was used in a construction to convey irrealis, for example, *I deh home then* ‘I will be home then’ (CWC, *deh*, hit 4).

Speakers of AECs use non-inflected forms for stative verbs. The intended meaning is non-past. The concordance search for *know* in the CWC provides a list of 73 instances; there are zero instances of *knew*. As in Nigerian Pidgin and other AECs, if a speaker wants to reference the past, an auxiliary must be used: *ain’t know* was the most common way to mark [+ past] using this particular stative verb in the CWC.

Reported above in Table 5.1, non-stative verbs in AECs appear in unmarked form and refer to a past event. This is seen in the use of *buy* in the CWC: *Nou I hear that you buy a house bou* ‘Now, I heard that you bought a house boy’ (*buy*, hit 8). An almost identical expression is found in Faraclas (2004) for Nigerian Pidgin: *A bay egusi for maket* ‘I bought egusi at the market’ (p. 341).

In the next section, I discuss instances of phrasal verb constructions and their double meanings to provide more support for the pluri-voicing argument made above. I focus on the use of morphemes in phrasal verb constructions in the CWC.

5.3.1 Cultivating ambiguity through phrasal verb constructions.

In this section, I provide a preliminary examination of phrasal verb constructions in the CWC data. A phrasal verb consists of a verb and a functional
morpheme, for example, *bring out* and *hook up*. Phrasal verbs are interesting from a cognitive semantic point of view because they are highly productive constructions that depend on functional morphemes to add semantic content to verbs in V1 position. By adding functional morphemes to verbs in phrasal verb constructions, speakers reconstruct their language and adjust the semantic constraints that are imposed on certain verbs. I look at ways in which functional morphemes are used in AEC examples and compare those morphemes to their functional equivalents in English, for instance, in the use of affixes, modals, or adverbials.

Interesting to note is the type of verb that appears in most phrasal verb constructions discussed below. Except for *link*, the verbs can be characterized as instantaneous verbs that have an inherent aspect of boundedness. Instantaneous verbs can be used in the progressive construction in English to modify the boundedness of an event: *The window was shattering*, which has a non-iterative, “slowed down in time” meaning (Kaplan, 1994, p. 196). In addition, speakers can add a morpheme to unbind the event. First, consider *burst out*. When a burst occurs, the event is over immediately. But, adding *out* to the verb extends the event of bursting. Second, consider the verb *link* in AECs and metropolitan Englishes. The CWC provides the following instance of *link* + morpheme: *if I geh a call I go link you back* (link, hit 10). In U.S. and British varieties of English, a speaker could use *link* in this way, too, although *hook* might be more common. A difference between English and AEC grammars becomes apparent at this point. English requires the preposition *with* after the phrasal verb construction: *I will link [hook] back up with you*, vs. *I will link [hook] back you*.

The morpheme *back* contributes an irrealis meaning in the AEC example above: *reconnect again at some time*. English conveys this meaning through the
combined use of a prefix re- and an optional morpheme (back or up), preposition (with), or adverbial expression (later). I admit that these are not extreme differences between English grammar and what is found in the CWC data. Below, however, I present instances of phrasal verb constructions from the CWC in which morphemes and their placements result in shifts in meaning that are not observed in U.S. or British varieties of English.

Rip off.

In English, rip undergoes a shift in meaning when a morpheme is added to the verb. The Oxford English Dictionary defines rip: ‘tear or pull (something) quickly or forcibly away from something or someone else’ (n.d., emphasis added). When the verb is used with an object, rip provides the ‘quick’ or ‘forcible’ meaning, whereas the morpheme provides the ‘removal’ meaning. In the CWC, there is a description of an event in which an affidavit was stapled to someone’s door and it was reported to have been removed:

20) They dou rip it off. (CWC, rip, hit 2)

They ripped it off.

The translation of (20) is a literal reading of the phrasal verb rip off; note the pronoun placement between the verb and the morpheme in AEC and the English translation to render the Oxford English dictionary meaning. In a different section of the CWC, there is a situation in which two individuals discuss the details of a robbery. In example (21), speakers use rip off in a way that is different from the previous instance:
21)  A: If he want thirteen thousand we gon rip off he head (CWC, rip, hit 1)

If he wants thirteen thousand, we will rob him.

B: you got to mek it look like you ripping off my head to (CWC, ripping, hit 1)

You have to make it look like you are robbing me, too.

In this conversation, the speakers employ the phrasal verb to mean rob, that is, cheat. Searches of rip off in two corpora of written English (FLOB and FROWN) return instances of the phrasal verb that are similar to the expressions in the CWC:

22) if you’re going to rip someone off when you’re ripping off your clothes, who better than Madonna? (FLOB_C16, lines 216-217)

23) You plan to rip me off? (FROWN_C05, line 81)

In both British and U.S. American English, the pronoun must occur between the verb and the morpheme. If a noun phrase occurs after the morpheme, as it does in ripping off your clothes, then the meaning of the expression becomes literal, that is ‘removing quickly or forcibly’. Thus, the sentence I will rip off NP’s head in U.S. American English cannot mean ‘cheat’, rather the intended meaning is ‘hurt or destroy’, either figuratively or literally. The expression rip NP’s butt off means ‘cheat NP’, whereas rip off NP’s butt sounds unusual and has some kind of physical connotation. I
conclude, then, that the following rules apply to English for the *rip off* phrasal verb construction:\(^3\):

i) if an NP appears between *rip* and *off*, the phrasal verb construction has a figurative meaning ‘defraud’ or literal meaning ‘remove’.

ii) if an NP appears after *off*, the phrasal verb construction has a figurative meaning ‘destroy’ or literal meaning ‘remove’.

In the CWC data, I observed that speakers A and B in example (21) used *rip off he head* and *ripping of my head* in ways that do not conform to the uses of *rip off* that were posited in (i) and (ii) above. Even though the body part appears after the morpheme, the intended meaning is still ‘cheat’, according to the translation provided by the court transcriber. At the same time, however, the expected meaning given the placement of the noun phrase posited in (ii) still applies: the act of robbing will result in the figurative removal of the head, thereby eliminating or killing the possibility of future activities. Double-voicing of *rip off* is illustrated in Figure 5.2 below.

\[ 
\begin{align*}
\text{a) ‘We will remove his head [the guy].’} \\
&\text{(NP after morpheme, reading has a figurative meaning ‘destroy’ or literal meaning ‘remove’)} \\
\text{We gon rip off he head.} \\
\text{b) ‘We will rob the guy.’} \\
&\text{(NP after morpheme, and yet intended meaning, according to court transcriber, is ‘rob’; has a figurative meaning ‘cheat’ or literal meaning ‘remove’)}
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 5.2 Double-voicing and the phrasal verb *rip off* in the CWC.

---

\(^3\) I ignore *rip off* to mean ‘imitate’, as there were no instances of *rip off* that had that meaning in the CWC.
The single utterance *rip off he head* simultaneously conveys two meanings, similar to the use of *swit* in Nigerian Pidgin in Figure 5.1. Afro-Caribbean English-lexifier creoles are especially good at this double-voicing phenomenon, which has been framed in terms of cultivating ambiguity in the sections above and which has most recently been explored by Faraclas and The Working Group on the Agency of Marginalized Peoples in the Emergence of the Afro-Atlantic Creoles (2016).

### 5.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I contributed to the discussion concerning complexity and simplicity in creole grammar by focusing on a discourse strategy called pluri-voicing (Faraclas et al., 2014), a phenomenon in which multiple voices are engaged through single instances of lexical and grammatical constructions in AECs. I turned attention to phrasal verb constructions in the CWC and found that AEC speakers use *rip off NP* to convey two meanings in a single utterance: one meaning follows the U.S. English pattern, in which the postposed noun phrase leads to a literal or figurative meaning ‘removal’; and the second meaning emerged as a novel Afro-Caribbean creole specific use of the construction in which a postposed noun phrase can render a figurative ‘cheat’ or ‘rob’ meaning. In U.S. and British varieties of English, the placement of the pronoun restricts one or the other intended meanings posited as (i) and (ii) above.
6.1 Overview

Fillmore (1968) represents one of the earliest works to depart from dominant generative linguistic approaches to semantics after the middle of the 20th century. Explicit in Fillmore’s work is the argument that words do not refer to truth propositions that exist externally and independently from the mind, but rather words carry conceptual frame structures to discourse. Words evoke in one’s mind a frame of reference. For example, when you use the verb *colonize*, you evoke ideas of a dominant party, a dominated party, interaction between parties, asymmetrical exchanges of ideas, periods of domination, forms of slavery; essentially, the use of the verb *colonize* evokes a colonization scenario. Fillmore (1976) called this analysis of the lexicon “frame semantics,” but scholars in literature and communication studies up to that point had used the terms *metanarrative* and *grand narrative* in similar ways.

Despite the many advances that creolistics has seen in the last fifty years, the European prototype narrative still pervades many approaches to the study of Afro-Caribbean languages and literatures. This narrative relies on monological unitary concepts that draw on colonial beliefs and European assumptions about Caribbean experiences (González López et al., 2012). In response to these approaches, the present work underscores the ways in which conceptual phenomena like frame semantics and mental processes like metaphorical and metonymic reasoning permit historians and students of Caribbean studies to deconstruct dominant discourses and
grand narratives about African- and Afro-Caribbean-descended persons and their cultural heritages. The work also emphasizes conceptual construal and cognitive grammar as properties of our “human semantic potential” (Regier, 1996), that is, the capacity to use language in a meaningful way and to understand meaning by drawing on general cognitive abilities.

6.2 Cognitive Grammar: Views from Creolistics

In the literature review of this thesis, I drew from a seminal work on network modeling in artificial intelligence (Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, & Hinton, 1986) to illustrate more concretely what image schematic concepts are and how cognitive linguists use them to describe aspects of language and cognition. Image schematic concepts are created by the activation of neurons in neural networks in the brain. Neurons that fire during our embodied experiences wire together and, consequently, strengthen the neural networks that they create. Patterns in language use are formed through neural activities that are responses to linguistic and non-linguistic input. This assumption is largely the basis for a usage-based model (Langacker, 1987, p. 494) and a neural theory of grammar (Feldman, 2006). Corpus linguistics strongly emphasizes usage-based approaches, as well, and it is firmly committed to extracting patterns of linguistic units and assessing their distribution in certain constructions and collostructions to reveal structural, semantic, and pragmatic characteristics of a grammar (Gries, 2012).

For the analysis of the verb/preposition interface in AEC in Chapter 2, I focused on phrasal verbs constructions, as those were seen as high-frequency constructional patterns in the CWC. Similar to English, the constructions contain morphemes that add semantic values to verbs. One of these values is a change of state meaning, for example, *maybe he switch over* (CWC, *switch over*, hit 1). Functional
morphemes in phrasal verb constructions were also found to provide information concerning path of motion. The morpheme *out* in *burst out* conveys an *outward path* meaning in both AECs and Englishes. A durative meaning is observed in the use of *out* in the expression *hang out*, although *hang* in itself does have an inherent aspect of unboundeness. The most frequently used morpheme in the data was *for*, and it most often co-occurred with motion verbs in the CWC. I found that *for* profiles a purpose value to render a Change of location [+completive] meaning in most instances of the *MV for* construction, which can be paraphrased using the verb *get*.

Future studies on functional morphemes and their verbal/prepositional qualities might look to additional uses of *for* in the CWC. In some cases, *for* was used in a benefactive construction. Roy (1975), in reference to Crucian, provides the following example of *for* in which a benefactive meaning is expressed: *Bring a half bottle of vanilla extract for me* (p. 73). Whether *bring for* should be seen as a construction, which is separated by the noun phrase *half bottle of vanilla extract* in the previous example, is not clear. There are instances in which *send for* has a benefactive meaning in the CWC data:

24) *I gah a gift to send for you to* (CWC, *send for*, hit 3)

I have something to send to you too.

In this example, the speaker uses *send for* and not *send to*. An additional example of the ditransitive construction using *send for* is seen in (25):

25) *...bring a hundred dollars to send for him* (CWC, *send for*, hit 4)

...bring one hundred dollars to give to him.
Roy (1975) provides an instance of send for in the ditransitive construction in Crucian (p. 74):

26)  *He send plenty howdy fo’ yo*

He sends you his regards.

The meaning of the construction send for in U.S. English roughly means ‘to contact, to retrieve’, for example, *President Ben sent for Levi*. In that example, send for means ‘send someone to get Levi’. In addition, the fixed expression can be used in cases of emergency when a speaker intends to receive assistance: *Send for help!*, in which send for can be glossed as ‘Go (and) get [help!]’ The CWC contains several instances in which for combines with the verb send, and the composite semantic value is Change_loc [+completive], for example, to mean ‘acquire’ or ‘get’. The morpheme for in those cases profiles a purpose value, similar to the uses of for in the MV for constructions discussed in Chapter 2. In (27) and (28), for renders an acquisition meaning in the send for construction:

27)  *... I gone send for the thing from you* (CWC, send for, hit 1)

I am going to set out [to get] the stuff from you.

28)  *How much [...] you going send for you personally?* (CWC, send for, hit 10)

How much [of the product] are you going to get for yourself?

The patient noun phrase can also appear between the verb send and the morpheme for:
29) *I gou always send a little something for me* (CWC, send NP for, hit 7)

I will always order something for myself.

The morpheme carries the [+completive] meaning. The action verb *send* and the motion verbs *come* and *go* do not convey a purpose or acquisition value. As a final example, examine (30) below, in which *for* in the second bold example is used to profile the purpose value of the acquisition event, or Change_loc [+completive] meaning.

30) *When you get a steel (GUN) act like how he does act, cool, calm collective not when you and a man a argue you telling he you going for steel (GUN) them out round ya don't have any steel and they nar go talk saying they going for none* (CWC, go for, hit 34)

When you have a gun, you have to act like a guy with a gun acts: cool, calm, collected, not [like] when you and a guy are arguing and you tell him that you are going to draw your gun; those around you [might not] have any guns, but they aren’t going to talk and pretend they can’t get them.

6.3 Metaphor and Metonymy: Views from Creolistics

In metonymic projections, a part can stand for a whole. The part that is highlighted determines the aspect of the event or object to which a speaker wishes to draw attention. There are also contiguity relationships to take into consideration in metonymic language use. When one asks for *some good heads to be put on a project*, for example, good heads refers to intelligent people. The point is not to use a part (head) to stand for a whole (person), but instead to pick out a particular characteristic
of the person, intelligence specifically, which is an attribute that is most closely associated with head as body part. In this sense, culture specific uses of body parts that refer to seats of emotion can be manifested differently in language use. Certain manifestations in creole languages have allowed creolists to trace the origins of metonymies to West African sources (Farquarson, 2012; Parkvall & Baker, 2012; Hollington, 2015). Indeed, there is considerable cultural and linguistic continuity that has been extended from West Africa to Afro-Caribbean creole contexts.

Yet, I maintain the position that scripting the human body to convey abstract expressions points less to one or the other source of linguistic influence on a creole lexicon, and more to shared metaphorical and metonymic conceptualizations of abstract expressions that are part of the human semantic potential. Universalist, superstratist, and substratist approaches underscore that potential, but each camp stresses in different ways how persons in contact situations drew on their creative capacities to bridge diverse backgrounds and to find modes of communication that suited their needs. The analyses of linguistic expressions of jealousy, anger, hunger, confusion, greed, contempt, and stubbornness in seven AECs discussed in Chapter 3 showed patterns of converge between West African languages, regional Englishes, and English-lexifier creoles.

6.4 Conceptual Metaphor Theory: Views from Afro-Caribbean Cultural Studies

Lakoff and Johnson (1999) drew from findings in cognitive science to help support their theory that our understanding of abstract ideas like morality, time, and love are based on embodied experiences. Those experiences help shape image schematic concepts that are believed to be the pre-conceptually configured structures we draw on when we think and speak about abstract experiences. Lakoff (1987) hypothesized that “preconceptual structural correlations in experience motivate
metaphors that map [basic] logic onto abstract domains. Thus, what has been called abstract reason has a bodily basis in our everyday physical functioning” (p. 278). Thought and language are based largely on basic-level and image schematic concepts, and these concepts have a direct link to action and primary perceptual experiences like up-down and dark-light. Drawing on this insight from conceptual metaphor theory, I argued that dominant philosophical, political, and theological discourses, which define concepts of truth, justice, and morality, carefully formulated and intentionally circulated specific metaphors about Africans, indigenous persons, women, and the colonies in the Caribbean and American continents. Specifically, these discourses relied on blending metaphors like UP IS SUPERIOR and, therefore, RATIONAL IS UP → MAN IS RATIONAL/SUPERIOR/GOOD, EUROPEAN IS RATIONAL/ SUPERIOR/GOOD. The converse of these metaphors included WOMAN, NON-EUROPEAN, NATURE IS IRRATIONAL/INFERIOR/EVIL.

At the core of Sekou (2005) and Bernabé, Chamoissoeau, & Confiant (1990), we find metaphorical interpretations of movement and metaphors that place humans in unity with their surroundings. Metaphor and metonymy are natural processes of the human mind. They are not only poetic devices for the creation of new meanings. They are sources for new insights and can be used for social-political resistance movements. Metaphor and metonymy have been responsible for positive and negative consequences, for example, via the metaphor PEOPLE ARE COMMODIFIABLE RESOURCES. Metaphorical and metonymic thinking, then, is not simply poetic language or primitive language; it is the way human beings as selves, not mere minds, move in all areas of discovery, whether scientific, religious, political, poetic, social, or personal.
PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS: *The cubs are in the field.*

Sekou (2005) presents a metaphor to readers in which history becomes mobilization. Sekou, a prominent literary critic and poet from St. Martin, urged young readers to move. He believed that movement by the youth, who he called *cubs*, would bring about change in Caribbean societies. Cubs, by definition, are young carnivorous mammals. He remarked that cubs—in St. Martin—have been “out on contract hits among the doubters/ been recruiting in the region of unbelievers/ long time a word like this…/ but the cubs are in the field” (2005, p. 38). Sekou implores St. Martiners to “risk the leap/ through hurricane-eyed gates of gale-wired cracks” (2005, p. 39), to take stage at schools, church meetings, carnival, and basketball courts. In these venues, Sekou states that youth must move “over the bridges all forward vision to country/ it must be you that is we self/ for there is no one else to guide & bide us protect & power us” (2005, p. 42). The new cubs symbolize “just power/ becoming & be/ … flourishing/ the mark & matter of the reign of change of the word that is the making of new flesh / of all the nation …” (2005, p. 44).

Fanon (2000 [1963]), like Sekou, urged Caribbean persons to dis-identify with the discourses that were imposed on them, the discourses which assured the other would remain marginalized and defined in relation to dominant discourses. Liberation has not been defined in Caribbean terms. Instead, liberation has been framed in terms of progress and development, which are Western ideals that have been implanted in the Afro-Caribbean region. “Liberation,” as defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary*, is “the act of setting someone free from imprisonment, slavery, or oppression” (n.d.). The dictionary cites the 15th century as the origin of the word in the English language. Ironically, the very notion of liberation first appeared in the English language at the start of the age of European exploitation of Atlantic peoples.
and their lands. Liberation remains a key theme in post-colonial texts which seek to explore the Caribbean consciousness. Liberation must be framed in a Caribbean context.

6.5 Cultivating Ambiguity: Dialogism in Afro-Caribbean Contexts

“Extension transference,” as described in Hall (1977), stands for the representation of knowledge externalized into perceivable units (pp. 28-40). In this view, modes of representation are mediums through which knowledge can be expressed. Language is an example of extension transference. The creation of technologies, songs, and dances are further examples. Western societies place great emphasis on the written record as a means of illustrating an objective reality of history, but writing is “shot through with intentions and [non-neutral] accents” (Bakhtin, 2000, p. 278), and we must be aware of the ways in which it can perpetuate a stereotype of a culture and its people. When a written record is printed and distributed, it becomes absolute and adds to the growing collection of extension transference(s) that can be used to argue for an objective history of a culture and its people. Yet, it is important to remember that oral and written modes “both proceed from the same source and both can be used, manipulated, and rejected according to the intentions, abilities and power of individuals or groups” (Roberts, 2008, p. 23). That power that Roberts refers to can be transmitted through a number of discourses, for example, oratory, text, semiotics, or silence.

As mentioned above, in many Western societies the written mode exerts more power and stands for higher prestige than the oral mode (for a critique of this practice in male-centered, western approaches to creole languages and cultures, see González López, 2014). The written mode relies extensively on grammar and textual structure to establish coherence and avoid ambiguity. Using Halls’ terms above, those
grammatical units serve as the perceivable units of knowledge that speakers draw on to express ideas in their language. It might be tempting for a linguist to focus on those perceivable units to gain insight on complexity in a given language. In fact, at the forefront of discussions on complexity and simplicity in pidgin and creole languages, one observes an obsession with perceivable units of grammar and speech sounds. Furthermore, the issue of complexity is usually examined comparatively, and those comparisons are made relative to features of the grammatical and phonological systems of European lexifier languages. What generally emerges from those studies reveals stereotypes concerning the superiority of European languages and cultures, but little acknowledgment of complex discourse strategies that are embedded in AEC modes of communication—strategies that are largely absent or avoided in Western modes of communication.

The motivation for the study of rip off in Chapter 5 stems from comments made in Aceto (2009) concerning phrasal verb constructions in AECs, which the author believes do not originate from historical or present-day dialects of English; examples include: kiss up ‘to kiss’, wet up ‘to wet’, and cook up ‘to cook’ (p. 215). These constructions could be seen as pluri-voicing strategies, one in which creole speakers tap into their lexifier and substrate heritages to create novel instances of phrasal verb constructions. Note that kiss up to is a phrasal verb that is found in metropolitan Englishes, too, but it has a different meaning than ‘to kiss’; cook up is similar in this respect. One finds to cook up X and to cook X up in metropolitan Englishes, but it does not mean ‘to cook’. In AECs, however, the simple verbs to cook and to kiss take the added morpheme. These are additional examples of pluri-voicing and ambiguous readings of tense and aspect. Specifically, these cases involve overt
marking of an aspect prominent system, similar to the use of V2 verbs in serialized verb constructions in aspect prominent West African languages.

6.6 Conclusion

Afro-Caribbean English-lexifier creoles are best framed in terms of voiced cultural experiences that represent their African and Caribbean contexts in terms of space, time, history, story, recreation, labor, revolution, cooperation, life, and death. In fact, it is not possible to talk about the languages of the Caribbean or the work that Caribbean creative writers engage without mentioning multiple histories, languages, and voices that are connected to the Afro-Atlantic. Scholars have begun to move away from dominant discourses that define language as a disembodied system that manipulates symbols and represents a value-neutral world. The present work recognizes the early calls from Alleyne (1971), Brathwaite (1984), Rickford (1987), and Harris (1999), whose works showed us that creole languages represent bridges that traverse time and space in the creole consciousness and that, even today, can only be understood in a social and historical context on a multidimensional continuum.

In this thesis, I have argued that AECs are varieties whose linguistic shapes reflect the composite of their multiple histories and linguistic ancestral ties. Speakers of those languages tap into their dialogized histories (see section 5.2 for discussions concerning this term) and, as a result, create complex, entwined, and sometimes ambiguous codings of surface forms in their contact languages. English-lexifier creoles might have one form that carries multiple meanings and functions. For instance, in the case of for in Nigerian Pidgin, speakers draw on lexifier, substrate, and adstrate languages for a contextual and grammatical coding of that morpheme (Corum, 2012; Faraclas et al., 2014, p. 190). For creole speakers, ambiguity is not a problem. There is no preoccupation with single “truths” that words reference, or the
objective “God’s eye point-of-view” of what a word might represent (Putnam, 1981, p. 49). One who subscribes to a universalist hypothesis, on the other hand, would argue that few to no ambiguous components exist in a language’s underlying grammatical system. In this view, there is an underlying structure that accounts for all languages of the world, whether these structures are overt or covert (see discussion in section 1.1 of present work).

Although humans share similar blueprints for the body, for example, two eyes, one head, one stomach, no wings, there is no reason to assume that humans share an internally consistent, monolithic conceptual system. Rather, there are numerous ways to understand and processes cultural conventions like language use, marital customs, and religious practices (Ríos Cintrón, 2010), for instance. Frames and mental models differ depending on people’s experiences, which could include a strict cultural heritage, formal versus non-formal education, and personal bodily experiences that have shaped views that people hold of themselves and their relationship with the world. Human beings create a world out of their physical surroundings. Particularities manifest in their linguistic and non-linguistic practices, and are often traced back to culture (for a discussion about ways in which mental exercises, habits, and customs creep into linguistic expressions, see McWhorter, 2014). But, there is no universal culture and there is no universal language. This means that there is no universal conceptual system. There is only the human imaginative capacity for making sense of an external world. Studying creole language structures provides a glimpse into a socially and historically situated world, where new languages were formed by drawing on complex cognitive capacities to generalize over learned linguistic forms and to construe new representations that reflected Afro-Caribbean and African-descended displaced persons’ new realities.
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doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2010.08.003


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## Appendix 1

### Table A1

**come for in the CWC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hit</th>
<th>KWIC search for <em>come for</em> (including forms <em>coming</em> and <em>came</em>)</th>
<th>Text file</th>
<th>token in text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>let in you know I coming for your head later</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>your head later [X]: you coming for my head later?</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>cook my food, I could come for you too</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>do wah? [X]: I could come for you [X]:</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>my food.&quot; [X] &quot;I could come for you to.&quot; [X] &quot;you</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>do what?&quot; [X] &quot;I could come for you.&quot; [X]</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>you deh , you want me come for it?</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>no ride [X]: eeeeh, I coming for it me son</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>me son U/M: you coming for it?</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>son U/M: so you come for your money then?</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>to me, you got something coming for me?</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>[X] tells U/M &quot;come for it&quot;</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>[X], &quot;You know what he come for?&quot; I don't know,</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>if you know what he come for, he come the thing</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>I telling you you cou come for a little day or</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>could ha tell he I coming for them you check?</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>could of tell he I coming for them you check.&quot;</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>just talking [X] say ya come for me now.</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>wah know if they gou come for a warrant for me?</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>eh my house they cah come for no warrant for me</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>[X] - They cah come for me […]</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>if they come for me an say they</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>[X] - Me hope they nah come for me</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>asks him if police is coming for him and [X] said</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>case them man ga ah come for me, at least I</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>he ask me if they coming for me, I tell he</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>frighten an no body ah come for you, you nah gah</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>what ever and done maybe come for she again I don'</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>[X]: wha you mean come for she again?</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>the morning my father gone come for all you, but ain'</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0 30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to his girl, anytime police come for him, she must go

he ah tell me dou come for, they wrong

why he tell me dou come for

back for it an she come for it an she gone

/M says yes he is coming for it.

for him, that he will come for it.

went dah way when somebody come for a half a thing,

his truck, when somebody had come for a "half a thing".

He was suppose to come for me, you geh it

that's wah they gou come for alone

tomorrow and tell you, you coming for that paper you want

tomorrow and tell you, you coming for that paper you want

An then she she come for five […]

 […] she come for twelve— mam come fo

 […] mam come for for one remember deh

three when she ha ha coming for

(UM) stated that he is "coming for one" then adds

U/M2: Yeah I wah coming for one, now

Eh!!!!!U/M2: I wah coming for one [Y]

- yeah because my ride coming for me 8 O'clock [Y]

- yeah because my ride coming for me 8 O'clock [Y]

[Y] - a dude coming for a half a scale

an so, deh dud had come for de half right?

UM "yeah I want you come for me because I don'

- Yeah I gou wah you come for me, cah Me eh

"no, no, I come for the quart then"

"no, no, watch yah I come for the quart then"

UM if he wants to come for it on his lunch.

think so [Y] - Oh somebody coming for [X]

tells [X] that somebody coming for[X]

le mother skunt before police come for he you hear.

U/M - Yeah I wah coming for one [Y] - Ah righ

tells [Y] that he's "coming for one" in a half

[Y] that he have someone coming for a quart later on.

ask [Y] "if he could come for one now," and [Y]

to happen, Darlene she is coming for a "unintelligible",

that there will be someone coming for a "1/2 scale

[X] tells [Y] he's comming for him to go to
that he was going to come for real.

the waiting for somebody to come for it.

there waiting for somebody to come for the thing them you

waiting for some body to come for it

here there waitin somebody to come for the thing them you

Watch here...boy, they does come for you when they ready

yeah U/F - Ok I coming for one ok!!!

s [Y] from 277-5782. She's "coming for one" (probably an o

/M told [Y] someone is coming for it

tells [Y] that he's coming for "food" (drugs)

dress, he said he will come for it. Shermaine asks hi

that the "white dude is coming for the home grown."

give to [X] she comin for them

Yeah tomorrow she come for them

tells Jude no one has come for [Y] yet.

I'm saysing, when they come for that they check in

[Y] tells [X] to come for it.

them thing and a man coming for one now

[Y]: want me come for you?

so you deh, two-fifty come for you?

[Y] says a guy is coming for a bottle

eh gah no reason to come for you [Y]

eh gah no reason to come for me they striking blow
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hit</th>
<th>KWIC search for <em>go for</em> (including forms <em>gone</em>, <em>going</em>, <em>went</em>)</th>
<th>Text file</th>
<th>token in text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>You know that next one got to go for five right?</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>... cah cause if ain't his car I could go for it</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>to this, no body suppose to know when he going for a hotel</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>how you asking what time. [X] says because I go for my car.</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>[X] say me aint no. [Y] say how you go for you car.</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>I wan you go for [X] right right now, right?</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>I could go for it you know, me ain gone use my</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>listen to this I want you go for Bucky right now</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>[X] says &quot;I could go for it you know, me aint going use my ...</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>&quot;listen no but hear here, I just going go for the girl to move it</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>I just were going for them thing them to go hide them</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>you hear I just was going for the thing them to go hide them</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>I never go for them, bo hear heah, it ga police clothes</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>ain't gone in the house yet, them man gone for a warrant</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>we known is his an we gou go for him right now</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>I can't come and tell you go for the ten-thou for me</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>me tell she take out the money beacu I going for the money</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>I would have go for my lawyer an send them pon my sister</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>[X] going for (unintelligible) or something I say</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>but my father said, he going for he money you check?</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>get two more then he will try to go for a &quot;bag of flour&quot; (cocaine)</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>they go for it. says that he wants to make</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>[X] says that she can't go for it because the judge ain't sign the</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>&quot;these things going for 110&quot; and asks if anybody up that side</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Who need to go for a month?</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Cah I gah one to go for nine hundred an all all now</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>my girl we going for dinner an so, and then we going movies</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>1   2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>[X] gone for it.&quot;</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>0   29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>then I going for [X] then I gan down there</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>1   30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>you telling he you going for steel(GUN) them out round ya don't</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>1   31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>any steel and they nar go talk saying they going for none</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>1   32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>yeah in Miami that would go for a good price</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>1   33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>boh if he deh in Miami that go for like a thou ($1000.00)</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>1   34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>asked [X] if [Y] is going for work for him, and he said no</td>
<td>CWC_BLA_Line_Sheets.txt</td>
<td>1   35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nou (inaudible) gah go for my car I cou meet you in a

[X] tells [Y] that "he got them pills going for 15 the man"
telling me to, to do...and then just not go for it
to do than just dòu go for it an they think somebody in there like
there was no long on it and nobody go for it by Wednesday
[X] asks so why all of a sudden going for ice?
me ain't got that much you know, they going for 650 dough
much of them I could get to make it go for six
not a fuck, if ain't for you, I going for nothing for no body me son
how you went for it he could a go for it, know them man a watch you
fuck if it ain't for you, I not going for nothing f for nobody fuck all that
[X]: you done went for General?
by the hotel me eh know wah; wah they went for
because it was last night he went for "them thing" (4 kilo's).
fuck up you know, cause is last night I went for them thing
playing no! U/F: hear the fuuck! So they went for your sister …?
maybe went for she, and then get the warrant and went
and in the morning them man went for them
just hid fuck and in the morning them man went for them
reminds [X] about the thing (cocaine) that they went for in the truck.
ask U/F if she went for the money by the court?
the general just got caught up...he went for vibes by [X] I believe
Watch yah he went for a vibes down by [X] I believe, an
he still went for the thing (drugs)
[X] tells [Y] that they went for [Z] on Saturday and they kick in…
same how you went for it he could a go for it
the same way you went for it he could of went for it
same way you went for it he could of went for it